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RETHINKING LEGAL EDUCATION*
BY ANTHONY D'AMATO**
The time has come to rethink legal education. I contend that it lacks a
soul-a soullessness that is a consequence of our absorption in and preoccu-
pation with the words of the law and how those words (and their meanings)
are manipulated. Law schools' focus on "law-words" is more than a glorifi-
cation of glibness. It tends to convince students of two things: that words
are talismanic keys to the kingdom of wealth and prestige, and that moral-
ity does not count. Students learn in the space of three years that "good"
legal arguments can be adduced for either side of any case and that what
wins lawsuits is the most sophisticated legal argument-not what is right,
true, or just. The students, in short, absorb the lesson of moral relativism,
and it stays with many of them throughout their careers as practitioners.
After my attempt to substantiate these bold charges, I shall recommend
a sea change: that law schools should deliberately turn away from the
study of law-words and instead study justice.1 I will contend that justice is
the only legitimate goal of the legal profession, and therefore the only legiti-
mate goal of law school study. Law schools should teach students how jus-
tice may be achieved through the words of the law by showing them how to
see right through the words to the underlying normative concepts of
morality and justice. For these normative concepts are the only concepts
that really count-in life and in law. Law schools need to turn away from
their presently technocratic mode-the teaching of instrumental proficiency
through law-word absorption and manipulation-and turn to
professionalism.
I acknowledge that a change of focus from law to justice might tilt law
school education to the idealistic side as compared to the workday practice
* © 1991 Anthony D'Amato.
** Judd and Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. David Barnhizer reaches the same conclusion-that law schools should begin focussing on
justice-for reasons quite dissimilar to the ones I give in the present essay. See Barnhizer, The
Revolution in American Law Schools, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 227, 263-64 (1989).
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of law (where achieving justice may sometimes be looked upon as a luxury
that a practicing lawyer cannot afford if the firm's rent is to be paid). Yet I
believe that this is a small price to pay for at least four benefits of focusing
on justice: Such a focus will make the study of cases in the classroom more
relevant and exciting; it will eventually produce better lawyers ("better" in
the sense of more efficacious, though perhaps morally better as well); it will
restore a sense of normative worth for law professors; and it will impart a
sense of professionalism to the practice of law.
To say that these propositions require proof is, of course, an understate-
ment. Since I cannot do the topic justice in the space of a law review essay,
I must rely on some previous writings to help fill out my present argument.
My citation of these other publications is never intended as substantiation,
but only as supplementation. Additionally, I want this essay to be a per-
sonal statement. I will refer to some of my own experiences as a teacher
and active litigator. I may at times appear to be writing more from the
heart than from the head, and if so charged, I plead guilty. Although the
propositions I put forth in this essay are bold, they may have the curious
virtue of incompleteness. You will not find here the typical "definitive" law
review article. Quite the opposite, this essay is deliberately open-ended.
Please send your comments and criticisms to this Review. The editors have
agreed to print all the correspondence in a future issue,2 and to give me the
opportunity to respond. In this manner the ultimate content and shape of
the present essay will be a function of our joint efforts.
Let us begin by asking: Compared to what is legal education not doing
its proper job? The model for comparison that I offer is the apprenticeship
system that predated law schools. Although we can only revisit the rough
features of that model in our imaginations, I think the picture will suffice as
a benchmark to begin evaluating what law schools are doing today.
I. THE PAST
We go back a century or two. We see a young man with a good mind
who wants to become a lawyer. (Alas, there were only male lawyers at the
time, so I will not be using the pronoun "she.") The young man finds a
practicing attorney who is willing to take him on as an apprentice.
Does the attorney give the young man homework reading assignments,
ask him questions about the reading on a daily basis, and then periodically
administer written examinations? Clearly not. No such "law school"




model ever existed in the apprenticeship era. The practicing attorney was
too busy to engage in that kind of abstract education. Instead, the young
man shows up and immediately tries to learn as much as he can while mak-
ing himself useful to the attorney. He sits with the attorney and takes notes
as the latter interviews clients and asks them questions. The young man
serves as general clerk and secretary, rewriting in a careful hand Mrs.
Smith's will and Mr. Perkins' proposal for a joint venture. Suppose a client
has to execute a deed. The attorney might give the young apprentice a book
to take home with him that evening, Deeds on Conveyancing. The appren-
tice duly reads and studies the book, and attempts to familiarize himself
with the existing law on conveyancing. The next day he shows up bright
and early at the firm, and learns that much of what he read in the book, is
unnecessary and misleading, although not all of it. "The way we handle
conveyances in this firm," explains the attorney, "differs in important re-
spects from what you can find in books. I want you to read the books to get
a general view, but read them with a skeptical eye. Then come in and learn
the way we really do it."
The apprentice accompanies the attorney to a meeting of the town's
governing body. The apprentice learns firsthand the way legal advice is
given to political bodies. He gets to know the important leaders in the
town. He sits by the attorney's side in meetings of boards of directors.
Sometimes the apprentice has to copy a brief written by the attorney.
The copying process helps him become familiar with the issues in the brief.
As he learns more about how law is practiced, he makes suggestions-"here
is one of the cases you asked me to read last night that I think we should
cite in the brief," or "I thought of an argument that the other side might
make." He attends negotiations and courtroom trials, and learns by obser-
vation and limited participation how the attorney operates.
If we try to characterize the "message" that the apprentice receives
about the practice of law, it might go as follows: An attorney tries first to
help people avoid problems, or, if necessary, to help them deal with problems
that have arisen. This characterization--either implicit or explicit in every-
thing the attorney does during the day-tells the apprentice the "what" of
the law. As his apprenticeship proceeds, he increasingly learns the "how"
of the law. Another message he absorbs with time is the "why" of the law.
The mere avoidance or solution of problems is not enough to make law a
profession. Surely, one should be skeptical about the mere desirability of
avoiding problems-perhaps avoiding them may be a bad idea, resulting in
a more boring life. Thus, if the apprentice were to ask the lawyer the
"why" question, the lawyer might respond: "An attorney tries, in his lim-
ited way, to promote justice. If client comes in with a fraudulent scheme in
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mind, like Mr. Johnstone the other day, you noticed I tried to talk him out
of it. If a client wants to take unfair advantage of another person, I try to
show him the disadvantages of that course of action-and I don't shy away
from telling him that it is not morally right, if he'll listen to that line of
argument.3 I would certainly try to tell him why the course of action may
backfire on him. But also, as you've noticed, if a client comes in with a just
cause-if our client, the Presbyterian church, has been swindled, or if Mrs.
Thompson has been hurt by a carriage that was negligently manufactured-
then it is our job to obtain redress for our clients in whatever official forums
are available. Even if the law seems to be stacked against clients who have a
just cause, we have to figure out a way to turn it around and make the law
work for them."4
I am not trying to paint a Pollyannish picture of the past. There may
indeed have been attorneys whose goal was to acquire wealth by advising
clients in the techniques of fraud. Rather, I am attempting to reconstruct
what an attorney might say to his apprentice that would appeal to the ap-
prentice's sense, and to our sense as well, of why the practice of law is
morally worthwhile. If the apprentice decided to become a lawyer because
he felt that he wanted to be part of a noble profession-because he wanted
to do some good in the world before passing on-then I think the attorney
might tell the apprentice something along the lines of the foregoing. I do
not think this general characterization is historically inaccurate. In the
United States, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lawyering
was regarded as a noble profession; indeed, it was lawyers who wrote the
Constitution.
The most important aspect of my picture of the apprenticeship system,
so far, is what has not been said. I have said very little about "law." The
"content of the law" is not what is important in the master attorney's daily
practice; what is important is people and their problems. "Law" is just a
3. A fictitious attorney-client conversation along these lines, which I offered to throw light on
the possible underlying reasons for the court's decision in a famous case where a beneficiary of a
will murdered the testator, was the subject of an earlier article of mine. See D'Amato, Elmer's
Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1129 (1975), reprinted in A. D'AMATo,
JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (1984).
4. I said the equivalent once before in an article that has been widely cited and almost as
widely misinterpreted:
The Moment of Truth for a practicing attorney occurs whenever a prospective client tells a
story that seems morally compelling but legally hopeless. That is where the attorney's
legal research should begin, not where it should end. Too much injustice persists in the
world because tired legal thinking has accepted unjust patterns as inevitable.
D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 461, 493 (1987).
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set of tools that can be utilized to help people avoid or solve their problems.
Yet, as we will see later, the "law" that is left out of my account of the
apprenticeship system is mostly what is put in to legal education. In es-
sence, that is what is distorting and soulless about legal education.
To the busy practicing attorney, law is nothing more than a set of tools.
He does not devote excessive time to the study of these tools. Rather, he is
in the "people" business, the "problem avoiding" business, the "problem
solving" business, and the "justice" business. His day is full of these con-
cerns. He does not study "the law" in general, and only "keeps up" with
legal developments that are very close to the areas of his practice. Nor does
he want his apprentice to be the equivalent of our modern computer-re-
trieval systems, having a head full of legal rules, many of which are wildly
inapposite even if superficially relevant.' Rather, he wants his apprentice to
learn how to help people avoid problems, solve the problems that have
come up, and achieve overall justice. Achieving overall justice is not only
good for business (the lawyer's reputation for probity in the community will
redound to his financial success), but indeed constitutes the reason why the
practice of law can be morally self-fulfilling.6
Since the point I am making-that law is simply a tool and not an end
in itself-is so critical, allow me one other analogy to days of old. Consider
an apprentice to a master carpenter. The master carpenter does not spend
more than the briefest amount of time introducing the apprentice to the
tools of the trade. He doesn't quiz his apprentice on the theory of different
kinds of sandpaper. Instead, the carpenter says, "Here, rub this No. 3
sandpaper this way, with the grain of the wood, but keep checking it against
the light to see that it is flat." The apprentice completes the task, and the
master carpenter says, "Now you want a finer finish. So look for some
sandpaper with finer sand on it." Thus the apprentice learns the actual uses
of sandpaper, as well as how to use the file and plane to put a smooth finish
on the wood. He learns the uses of these and other tools all for the purpose
of helping the master craftsman turn out actual pieces of furniture. The
"best" tool for a particular job is primarily a function of what the job ought
to be, and secondarily a function of what tools are available. It is in the
conceptualization of the job that the apprentice learns how to become a
5. It is noteworthy that although LEXIS® and WESTLAW® have opened up ways of retriev-
ing precedents that would have been lost and buried under older categorization procedures, there
has arguably been no net gain to society. Since attorneys for both sides of a case have access to
these computer retrieval systems, the result is simply more law-words to cope with as an input in
any given case. There is no readily discernible effect upon truth or justice.
6. Many lawyers today, in their 40's, report a sense of burnout. They have achieved success
as lawyers, but they wonder if they have contributed anything to society.
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master craftsman. A particular table, for example, is being designed for
Mrs. Field's living room. She is tall, so the table must be higher than aver-
age. She wants a drawer under the tabletop for papers and wants to be able
to sit at the table; thus the legs of the table must be free standing and not
reinforced by crossbars. Oak would be the best color for the living room,
but because oak is one of the hardest of woods, the construction of this table
will take twice as long as normal-this has to be figured into the estimated
price. Most important of all, the table has to be aesthetically pleasing. It is
almost impossible to teach the apprentice aesthetics, but hopefully the ap-
prentice will show an aptitude for it (if not, the apprentice will probably not
become a master craftsman). If the apprentice has an innate sense of aes-
thetics, then the most important thing he can learn from the master crafts-
man is how to make fine judgments between this alternative and that one
(i.e., what this piece of wood will look like when stained, and how strong it
is compared to that wood, and whether existing tools can be effectively uti-
lized to achieve the final "look" that is desired).
Neither for the law apprentice, nor for the carpenter apprentice, are the
tools the important thing. To focus excessively on the tools would be to
distort the mental processes of judgment that must be brought to bear in the
successful discharge of the profession. The apprentice carpenter soon dis-
covers, for example, what can best be done with a plane and what can best
be done with sandpaper, but he also discovers that if one isn't available you
can get along fairly well, although less efficiently, with the other. But it is
not by studying sandpaper that he becomes a master craftsman. Rather, it
is by studying the problems that people have (Mrs. Field wants a nice look-
ing, serviceable table), and the goals he wants to achieve on their behalf
(pleasing her by presenting her with an aesthetically pleasing yet durable
and functional table), that he can look forward to a successful and satisfying
career as a master craftsman. Mrs. Field is only interested in the resulting
table; she has no direct interest (though she may be interested for other
reasons) in the tools that were used to do the work.
Professions and crafts are properly judged by the results they produce,
and not by the techniques that are brought to bear in producing those re-
sults. Yet we see in many aspects of present-day life examples of runaway
technique. Consider the pianist in a restaurant or night club who has a
dazzling technique, but who produces boring music. Keyboard virtuosity is
no substitute for "soul"-for the kind of musical ability that understands
what moods and ideas the composer was trying to achieve and how to read
[V'ol. 74:1
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and interpret the composer's score to recapture those emotions.7 We see
student editors publishing law review articles apparently on the sole basis of
the impressiveness of the lengthy footnotes-the trappings, but not the sub-
stance, of scholarship. We purchase technologically sophisticated word-
processing systems only to discover that the instruction manuals are incom-
prehensible, incoherent, and disorganized. The manuals give us no sense of
what the typical user wants the software to do. Rather, the manuals strive
to tell us everything at once that the software itself can do-a glorification
of technique over substance. The computer instruction manual is a lot like
law school, which teaches students all kinds of forgettable things about the
law itself and little about what lawyers need it for.'
When, many years ago, the legal apprentice system was gradually re-
placed by law schools, what happened was that students were taught "the
law" in abstraction. Although "cases" were read, the facts of those cases
were taken as stated by the courts (which present a highly selective and
often misleading picture of the actual facts). In contrast, the apprentice had
learned the facts of cases by daily contact with clients. Students in law
school get only a truncated and highly selected version of the facts. More-
over, law schools considered it to be entirely irrelevant what happened to
the parties after the case was handed down (Did they settle? Did they con-
tinue to litigate? Was the judgment ever paid? What effect did the case
have on their lives?). In contrast, the young apprentice lawyer had to live
with the effects of his legal work on his clients. He had to "follow through"
in the lives of his clients, not only because he was dependent upon them for
his livelihood but because any legal work he did for them was only part of
their general situation. No case was "discrete" in the sense that law stu-
7. I agree with Stanley Fish that the author's "intent" does not constrain how we should
interpret her work. See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERACY AND LEGAL STUDIES 259-96 (1989). Rather, we need
some conception (even if not the true one) of the author's intent in order to read the text (or
composition) in a meaningful way. For example, I have heard many recordings of great pianists
interpreting Chopin in wildly divergent ways. I have no idea which of them, if any, interpreted
Chopin the way Chopin wanted to be interpreted (or perhaps in the way Chopin himself played
his compositions). But I do have very strong convictions that some interpretations are far better
than others. I would assume (call it a pious hope) that Chopin would have agreed with me.
8. To carry the analogy further, the law school curriculum is as disorganized as the computer
instruction manual. Much of the disorganization is due to the abdication of law schools to the
consumer market place, allowing students to pick and choose courses in any order so that, for any
given student, there is no progression in the learning process. Higher-level courses spend half the
semester reinventing the wheel, when instead-if there were a rational progressive system in the
curriculum-those courses could begin at a more advanced and exciting level. Lack of overall
curricular rationality is perhaps one important reason why law students are increasingly "turning
off" in their junior and senior years.
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dents read cases; nearly everything about the practice of law was, in Ian
Macneil's sense, relational.9
Perhaps the first thing that went wrong with law schools was the fact
that they were given the name "law school." (Things might have turned
out differently had they been called colleges of justice.) The name "law
school" gave rise to an expectation that this was a school to which a person
could go to "learn the law." At that point, self-defined academic concerns
began to reconceptualize what "learning the law" meant. Professors began
to write textbooks on what "the law" consisted of, and to sell these books to
their students as required reading. To ensure that the students read the
books, the professors quizzed the students on their ability to regurgitate the
rules contained in the texts. Students "fought back" by inventing the law
review, where they could accept or reject professorial essays. A revolution
of sorts was accomplished by Christopher Columbus Langdell, 10 calling for
the replacement of textbooks by appellate court opinions, which served as
the new texts. Since this took a source of publication away from the law
faculty, they countered by compiling casebooks with cases and excerpts
from appellate court decisions. New texts-hornbooks and nutshells-were
written to explain to the lazy student what the cases meant. Finally, today,
casebooks and texts are merging. We are seeing more and more editorial
notes and comments in "casebooks," and fewer and fewer cases. The cases
that are presented are severely truncated, and-what is the worst develop-
ment of all-the "facts" are often omitted.
Law schools occasioned an explosion of legal writing. Every published
essay potentially gave birth to a host of competing critical essays. Much of
the writing concerned the interpretation of legal texts, and the theories that
could be invented and used to construe those texts. Theories spawned more
theories. At the present time, to exaggerate only slightly, a single case or
statute is significant only because it instantiates(it )Tj
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Instead of learning, as through the apprenticeship system, that law was
a set of tools whose function was to help people avoid or solve problems in
the interests of societal justice, students began to be examined on their mas-
tery of the content of the tools themselves. The result was a wrenching
distortion of what "law" is all about. Yet I must make it clear that I am not
advocating a return to the apprenticeship system. Law schools historically
have played the immensely important role of destroying the "old boy" net-
work of legal apprenticeship and opening the legal profession to all persons.
We are a much more egalitarian society as a result of the law school move-
ment. Nor am I necessarily advocating an expansion of "clinical educa-
tion" in law schools12 or the "legal skills" movement.13  My present
concern is not with techniques of teaching but with justice as an organizing
principle that could realign the way we teach substance as well as
technique.
At this point a reader might make two critical comments, which I label
"cynical" and "extra." The cynical argument, one version of which I heard
expressed in a meeting of students last week at Northwestern, was "Let's
assume that you learn absolutely nothing in law school. Your $45,000 tui-
tion is still worth it because it gets you a Northwestern diploma, which is
your ticket to a high-paying job with a major law firm." Another spin on
the cynical view is that law schools are socially important because they slow
down by three years everyone who wants to become a lawyer, even weeding
out a few along the way. Bar associations would not dream of abolishing
law schools because of the flood of new entries into lawyering that would
ensue, driving down existing quasimonopolistic fees.
Whether or not these cynical views appeal to some academics, I am
confident that they do not appeal to anyone who cares enough about legal
education to read an essay on the subject. I assume that my readers (both
12. There are many things about clinical education that I admire. In 1968, I joined several
other colleagues in advocating the establishment of a serious full-time clinical education program
at Northwestern Law School; our lobbying efforts were successful, and so has been the clinic that
resulted. But the way clinics in general have fitted into the overall legal educational enterprise has
been, in my view, inimical to the benefits that they could have conferred upon our students. It is
as if they have been corrupted by their association with the aimlessness and lack of soul of the
normal curriculum. To give just one example (because this is not an article about clinical educa-
tion): Clinics tend to select their real-world cases for their "legal" instructional value to students,
and not because a client has been the victim of a clear injustice.
13. I am all in favor of using simulation for classroom teaching, of classroom advocacy train-
ing including hypothetical cases, (a technique I helped introduce in B. WESTON & R. FALK & A.
D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK
(2d ed. 1990)), alternative dispute resolution exercises, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, etc.
But all of these techniques need the same focus on justice, in my opinion, that I urge for the law
curriculum as a whole.
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of them) would not be in legal academia if they didn't care whether what
they are doing has intrinsic value. Therefore, with some confidence, I sim-
ply mention the cynical arguments and then drop them as irrelevant to the
present enterprise.
The second kind of criticism could be labelled the "extra" argument. If
three years of legal education are spent in largely ineffectual or misguided
studying, our students become apprentices anyway by apprenticing them-
selves to the senior partners in a law firm. So perhaps we should look upon
law training as a pre-apprenticeship "extra" and not worry too much about
its content.
But the answer to this argument is that the true apprenticeship system is
no longer available. There are no longer any traditional attorneys out there
who themselves learned law through the apprentice system. Every attorney
in legal practice today and every sitting judge who is a lawyer is a product
of a law school education. None of our students can get the equivalent of a
classical apprenticeship after graduating from law school.14 They are only
getting an experience that is skewed by senior attorneys who themselves
were the product of a similar law school education.1" The law school expe-
rience thus perpetuates itself. Law schools have, over time, unalterably af-
fected everyone's perceptions about what "law" consists of because no
lawyer today has begun the practice of law uncontaminated by a law school
education. Hence, law schools are not simply an add-on to the old appren-
ticeship system, but a total-and alien-substitute for it.
So far I have argued that by focusing on tools rather than on real-world
practices and goals, law schools distort and misdescribe for students what
"law" is for and what it is all about. But if this were all there were to the
story, it might be considered to be weak tea. A skeptical reader might
shrug her shoulders, and say: "So learning how to be a lawyer has changed
from the way it was a couple of hundred years ago-what else is new?"
14. For students who "hang up a shingle" directly after law school, there is no further educa-
tion in the law at all (except for bar-mandated continuous legal training courses).
15. Aggravating the problem is the increasing specialization of attorneys. In large firms it is
practically impossible to practice holistic law-the client's problem is divided and subdivided and
parcelled out to specialists in the firm. A more holistic practice would appear to be possible for in-
house corporate attorneys, but while they may get to "know" the corporation over a long period
of time, the corporation is an abstraction. To some extent in-house counsel get to know long-
staying management personnel in the corporation (and often handle their personal problems), but
the representation of such personnel is somewhat skewed because it always has to be checked and
balanced against the attorney's primary duty to the corporation. Of course, a small number of
small-town general attorneys still practice holistic law, but their number is declining and even




To answer the skeptic's challenge, I must turn from the past to the
present.
II. THE PRESENT
My charge that law school education lacks a soul is in part evidenced by
numerous symptoms of discontent in the legal academy. Consider the
plethora of "law and" courses that increasingly fill our curriculum. These
courses couple law with subjects as diverse as literature, economics, sociol-
ogy, political science, psychology, philosophy, and medicine. Moreover,
there are courses whose purpose is to attack other courses, such as Critical
Legal Studies and Feminist Jurisprudence. I have no criticism of any of
these new courses as such. Rather, I welcome them and have on occasion
taught some of them. But their proliferation is a sign that collectively we
are groping for a cure for educational malaise and aimlessness.
In addition, students are coming to class less prepared than in past
years, and are increasingly cutting classes when they can get away with it.
They are also beginning to work in law firms the summer after their first
year in school, and many of them continue to work at the firm on a part-
time basis (but nevertheless logging a great many hours) during their sec-
ond and third years of law school. When they are engrossed in law-firm
work (which is often a form of glorified paralegal practice), they can hardly
devote their attention to what is going on in class. There is scarcely a law
school not characterized by third-year apathy, and this apathy is spreading
at an alarming pace into the second year) 6 Students are increasingly com-
ing to law school with a jungle-realist attitude firmly in place: that they are
going to law school primarily to find their first job and that everything else
is just a matter of hurdle-jumping (getting adequate grades, passing the bar
examination). A typical student's attitude might be: "law school is just one
more obstacle they've put up in the way of my right to go out and practice
law."
16. This apathy may be in part the result of the failure of law schools to prescribe curricular
sequencing and building. I know from personal experience that even if a faculty chooses to adopt
a rational sequencing curriculum, it may be undermined by individual faculty members (exercis-
ing "academic freedom") to allow students into their courses who have not taken the prerequisite
course. The result is that each course, no matter how ostensibly high the level, must reinvent the
wheel in order to accommodate the students who did not take the prerequisites. If it were politi-
cally possible to establish a tight sequencing program with no deviations, I suspect that the upper
level classes would be more exciting for the students (who will be dealing with more intellectually




These and other observations that could be adduced add up to a very
real educational crisis. In my view, legal education has lost its mooring and
is adrift on a horizonless ocean. We are in the midst of enormous "para-
digm shift," as Steven Winter has called it.17 It is scary, because no one can
see where it will end.
Fortunately, at least in my view, there is one dominant reason for the
malaise. Although still perhaps subconscious in the academic community,
it is daily becoming more noticeable. It is summed up in the word "indeter-
minacy." It is the growing, gnawing realization in the collective professo-
rial mind that law does not matter in the decision of cases. As the collective
academic mind becomes more and more convinced of this proposition, bru-
tal and fundamental questions will be raised about why law is studied at all.
This is the paradigm shift that Professor Winter has described, and this I
submit is the root cause of the present malaise about legal education. 8
I hasten to say that indeterminacy is not tantamount to asserting that it
does not matter which way any given case is decided. (That would truly be
frightening!) Yet some mainstream scholars accuse indeterminists of nihil-
ism; they say that indeterminacy stands for "anything goes" in judicial deci-
sion-making. But their view is a perversion of the indeterminacy idea. It
stems from their mainstream conviction that if law doesn't constrain the
results of cases, then nothing constrains those results. But surely this is not
true, neither logically nor empirically. The indeterminist maintains that
while law does not constrain judicial decisions, normative factors ought to,
and do, exert constraint upon judges who are sensitive to moral values.
Cases ought to be decided according to justice and fairness. Nothing more
or less than justice ought to constrain the results of cases. Indeed, upon
reflection, justice as a normative notion means that we can properly use the
word "ought" in the preceding sentence. In contrast, "law" is not norma-
tive-it is a fact (a fact concerning certain markings in ink in certain books
that we interpret as having certain meanings). These markings in and of
themselves cannot have any morally compelling role to play in the decision
of cases. Only those inked markings whose meanings track normative con-
siderations of justice have any claim upon our decision-making, and then
17. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639 (1990).
18. David Barnhizer says that the present malaise in law teaching is the result of the shatter-
ing of the "myth of science" which has led to "idiosyncratic fragments of challenge to mainstream
articulation of primary interests" instead of the old "linear sense of shared scientific or rational
progress." Barnhizer, supra note 1, at 246. I suspect that people felt exactly the same way in 1870
(reconstruction), 1890 (pragmatism), 1910 (special relativity), 1930 (quantum theory), 1950 (ordi-
nary language philosophy), and 1970 (flower age children). There is always a sense that the old
ways are shattered, that the younger generation has brought chaos to the academy.
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only because-and to the extent to which-they track and reflect our sense
of justice. It is only the justice component that is (usually) found underly-
ing law-words that can exercise any normative pull. 9
The germ of the idea that law-words themselves do not in fact constrain
judges was planted by the American legal realists in the late 1920s. It be-
came the dominant theory by the 1950s, yet was somewhat half-hearted (it
still lacked a strong philosophical base). Many law professors only gave it
lip service. Realism went into decline in the period roughly from 1960 to
1980, but then the pendulum started to swing back in the realist direction,
fueled at first by the critical legal studies movement, then by feminist juris-
prudence, and now by the more politically neutral deconstructionist and
indeterminist movements. I call this present form of legal realism "Prag-
matic Indeterminacy" and have attempted elsewhere to sketch its history
and main features.2 °
My best brief statement of the core idea of Pragmatic Indeterminacy is
the following: If we regard the law as all the law-words written in all the
law books (case reports, statutes, monographs, retrieval computers, graphs,
mathematical formulae, economic theories, philosophical theories-any-
thing in a law library),2 no conceivable organization of any or all of these
law-words will constrain a judge to decide any given case a particular way.
The judge can always "find" a meaning in the words that will favor which-
ever party to whom the judge wishes to grant the decision. No matter how
"clear" the statute and no matter how much it strikes us as "applicable" to
the case at hand, the judge can always state and interpret the facts of the
case in such a way that they do not appear to come under the statute or that
they appear to constitute an equitable exception to the statute. Moreover, a
judge can select those facts favorable to one side and downgrade or even
omit those facts that would suggest that the other side should have been
19. If a judge is bribed, corrupted, or has an undisclosed material conflict of interest, is dis-
honest, is extremely lazy, or the like, then "justice" arguments may not work. But even then, the
only argument that has any chance of working is a "justice" argument. If compelling enough,
then a strong justice argument may overcome a mild case of corruption.
Pierre Schlag, Richard Delgado, and several others, have urged us to abandon normativism.
To the extent that they are talking about word-bound prescriptivism, I agree with them. How-
ever, the pre-verbal sense of "ought" that we have is quite different.
20. See D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 148 (1990).
21. When I say "law-words" I include, of course, the meanings that we attribute to those
words. That two people may attribute different meanings to the same word is nearly a truism of
twentieth century philosophy. But there is no point in concluding, from this truism alone, that
there is no such thing as a meaning that each of us attributes to words. See, e-g., Searle, Indeter-
minacy, Empiricism, and the First Person, 84 J. PHIL. 123 (1987).
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awarded the decision. 22 Even if the facts are conceded (as in a stipulated set
of facts), the facts as stated still need to be interpreted. By emphasizing
some facts and downplaying others, the judge can put her own "spin" on
the facts. Finally, the judge is free to interpret the rules of law that both
parties serve up in briefs for her to choose from. Since the briefs will state
opposing rules of law (or opposing interpretations of the same rule), the
judge's job is easy. She simply has to choose the brief of the side she has
selected to win the case. That brief will contain a ready-made rationaliza-
tion of the result that the judge has chosen to reach. Isn't it ironic that we
spend three years teaching our students to come up with the best legal brief
on their client's side of the case-in full knowledge that other law schools
will teach their students to come up with the best legal brief on the other
side of the case-when the net result of all this teaching and effort is to
present the judge, on a silver platter, two utterly conflicting, but excellent,
legal rationales for whichever side the judge chooses to win the case? We
may be actually encouraging judicial arbitrariness by all this effort. The
judge simply picks the side she wants to win, and then instructs her clerk to
incorporate that side's brief in writing the rationalizing opinion.
To be sure, some people may claim that the judge's decision is "wrong
on the law." (Years later, law students may say it when they read her deci-
sion in their casebooks.) But others (including the judge, and the winning
party) will say that the decision was "right on the law." There is no process
for resolving this matter, for even an appellate court, including the Supreme
Court of the United States, can be criticized for having reached a decision
that was "wrong on the law." Thus, all of this kind of criticism, in my
view, is misguided. I realize that this is one of the boldest statements in the
present essay, for maybe 90% of everything that appears in law reviews and
law journals is devoted to evaluating decisions as either right or wrong on
the law.23 When we use the words "right" and "wrong," what we really
mean-and what we can only mean if we want to avoid nonsense-is mor-
ally right or wrong. Any use of "right" or "wrong" to apply merely "to the
law" (as Dworkin uses them in his "right answer" thesis) is, and must be,
parasitic upon the moral content that we have learned to invest in those
words. Such use confuses and muddies the precision of our language and
22. See, e.g., D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts, 11 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 1313 (1990).
23. To a large extent, this furious publishing activity helps student editors become even
sharper manipulators of law-words. Hence, even though much of this law-journal outpouring
may have no effect whatever on the real world, it may be a (rather expensive) way of teaching
students and professors to become better manipulators of legal language by rewarding them with
seeing their writings published.
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our thoughts. (The next time you get really angry about a judicial decision,
ask yourself whether your criticism that the decision "is contrary to the
law" is not really based on your conviction that the decision was in fact
contrary to your deepest sense of justice. You are only criticizing the deci-
sion in conventional legal terms because that is the standard, normal mode
of criticism of decisions. But what motivates you to say that the decision is
"wrong" is your sense that it was an unjust decision--even though you
don't say this in your analysis because our currently preferred mode of legal
analysis does not encourage saying it.)
Many scholars (and judges) object that legal realism and pragmatic in-
determinacy amount to saying that judges simply use the law to rationalize
results that they have reached by other means and that such a characteriza-
tion of their decision-making processes is empirically inaccurate. They say
that most judges do not first decide which side to award the decision to and
then rationalize the result. Rather, they claim that judges listen to the legal
arguments and then decide the case according to the law. Indeed, the Prag-
matic Indeterminist may concede that many judges believe they are con-
strained by the law. But Pragmatic Indeterminacy challenges whether they
are in fact constrained. The philosopher who has looked most deeply into
this matter is Wittgenstein.24 As Saul Kripke has explained, there simply
can be no behavior that is truly constrained by any specific rule.25 The
24. Wittgenstein is generally conceded to be the greatest philosopher of the twentieth cen-
tury, but most people think that Wittgenstein simply contributed to the growth of "ordinary lan-
guage philosophy." Some people know that in his first book, L. WITrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS
LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1922), Wittgenstein demolished the basis for metaphysics. But only a
few people have recognized that Wittgenstein's most important contribution is also of revolution-
ary importance in our daily lives-the downfall of the notion of "following a rule." The essence of
the idea is contained in L. WrrrGENSTEIN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 202 (Anscombe
trans. 1953): "[i]t is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a
rule would be the same thing as obeying it." This simple sentence contains what I think is the
most significant truth in all philosophy. It is extraordinarily difficult to understand, but once it is
understood, Wittgenstein's immense revolution in human thought can be glimpsed. Wittgen-
stein's position (encapsulated in the sentence) entails many significant consequences for law. For
one thing, it would dismiss as nonsensical the "internal aspect" of rules championed by H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1971), and generally thought of as essential to our understanding
of law. More than that, it demolishes all of legal positivism (the notion that law is a command,
the idea that there is in each state a "sovereign"). It pulls the rug out from under all claims by
judges that they are "constrained" by existing law to decide cases a certain way. But it also opens
up an entirely new approach to the idea of legitimacy and the basis for statutory interpretation. I
feel safe in predicting that the next few decades of legal scholarship will be characterized as an
effort to come to grips with the consequences of the Wittgensteinian revolution.
25. No matter what the rule, any fact is compatible with a reinterpretation of that rule, and
there is no "fact of the matter" that rules out any reinterpretation. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHIL-
OSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953); S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LAN-
GUAGE (1982).
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reason for this is that we (and judges) are always free to reinterpret the rule
in such a way as to justify any decision we want to make.26 We can say:
"Yes, Rule X applies in this case, and it has always applied to cases like this
one, and we are not deviating from it at all; but properly interpreted, Rule
X is in fact slightly different from what meets the eye." To be sure, such
reinterpretations may strike the reader as "weird" and hence unjustified.
For example, I wrote an article recently that characterized Judge Edwards'
view of the constitutional provision "Judges shall hold their offices during
Good Behavior" as if it read "during Good or Bad Behavior."27 Judge
Edwards' reading, I contended, simply made nonsense out of the Good Be-
havior Clause. But I am only a writer of law review articles; Judge Ed-
wards is a sitting judge. If in a case that comes before him he were to hold
that the Good Behavior clause means "Good or Bad Behavior," his word
will be the final one.28 He will win and I will lose, no matter how "weird" I
think his interpretation is.29 The more I argue that his view is "weird," the
more he can reply that I simply do not understand the law.
Pragmatic Indeterminacy is not "nihilistic"-it does not claim that
judges totally disregard the law.30 The reason that judges do not simply
26. Technically, Wittgenstein has shown that any stated rule cannot constrain behavior be-
cause the rule can be reinterpreted to be consistent with any behavior of the actor's choice. See
Yablon, Book Review, 96 YALE L.J. 613 (1987) (reviewing S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON
RULES AND PRIVATE LANAGUAGE (1982)).
27. D'Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could Be Mis-Regulation, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 609 (1990).
28. There is always a theory available to Judge Edwards to support his result. Suppose the
case involves a judge accused of deciding cases invariably according to which lawyer gave him the
most money for his judicial campaign. Judge Edwards can fashion a theory to the effect that,
under our present political system, a state judge is free to raise money for his campaign. The
Good Behavior Clause must be construed in accordance with the American political process,
which allows the popular election of judges.
The world is full of rationalizations and reinterpretations. Endless amounts of ink can be
spilled spinning them out. Pragmatic indeterminacy says, in effect, "Wake up-the law is never
going to force a judge to decide a case a certain way if the judge wants to decide the case the other
way!"
29. A famous example of a decidedly "strange" interpretation issued from on high is Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The question was whether Congressional power to regulate inter-
state commerce applied to home-grown and home-consumed wheat. The Supreme Court said
"yes" because a farmer's consumption of his own home-grown wheat meant that some other
wheat that might have moved in interstate commerce to supply the farmer's personal consumption
needs would not in fact move in interstate commerce because the farmer had no need for it!
30. Pragmatic indeterminacy does not say that statutes and cases have no effect on public
behavior. The "law" has an immense effect on aggregate social conduct: raise the speed limit on
highways and the average vehicular speed goes up, institute taxation and a large number of people
will pay taxes. What those of us who teach law have to disabuse ourselves of is the notion that the
law determines the way a judge will rule in a given case. The law may help us predict the way a
judge will probably rule, but it cannot determine the way a judge must rule.
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dismiss law out of hand is that the law contains within it a great deal of
accumulated wisdom about justice. Many, although certainly not all, judi-
cial precedents reflect an attempt to be fair and just to the parties. Many,
although not all, judges feel an obligation to be fair and just to the parties.
Therefore, for these judges, the law-words of statutes and judicial prece-
dents have an important role to play. I have argued that these "law-words"
act as a heuristic device to help the judge's thought processes in calling,
collating, and sorting out relevant justice factors. 31
Ordinary citizens take the prescriptions of the law into account in
reaching their decisions in daily life, but they implicitly have to guess how
some future judge might interpret those prescriptions in light of the particu-
lar fact situation.32 Often citizens are guided by their own sense of justice;
for example, they may not know the intricacies of the criminal code, but
they can tell when an act is right or wrong.
Of course, judges will give reasons why a result was reached. These
reasons will almost inevitably be of the type: "the law admitted of only one
result." The decision will then explicate "the law" that apparently con-
strained the judge. Judges tend to avoid talking about fairness or justice
because those terms seem subjective. Judges want to make it appear to the
litigants that their own judicial preferences did not enter into the decision-
the decision reached was a scientific, objective result of finding and applying
the law. By clothing the decision in neutral sounding law-words (often
available in byte-size chunks in the winning side's brief), the judge succeeds
in diverting the losing party's expectable dissatisfaction with the verdict to
"the law," away from the judge. The law is to blame, not the law-finder.
Is this a matter of a lack of candor on the part of judges? Are they just
fooling us with their opinions that are replete with legal reasoning that ra-
tionalizes the result they have reached? This is not the place for me to
attempt a full answer to that question, but it is appropriate here to suggest
that the question itself masks an important part of the story. A judicial
opinion, as Stanley Fish has pointed out, is a "presentation" of the judge's
31. I have spelled out this notion of law as a heuristic device in D'Amato, supra note 20, at
179-81.
32. Suppose you are driving along a highway and see a sign: "Construction zone-35 mph
limit." Neither you, nor any other driver, slows down to 35 mph. You know "from experience"
that construction zone speed limits are set unreasonably low by the highway department in order
to reduce civil liability resulting from automobile collisions with construction equipment. It is
theoretically true that you might be arrested for speeding when you drive in excess of 35 mph, but
experience tells you (and all the other motorists) that the police do not enforce this kind of speed
limit posting. You might reasonably guess that a traffic-court judge would agree with you in the
unlikely event that you are arrested for exceeding 35 mph.
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craft.3 It is an attempt to put into words a justification of the decision the
judge has reached that will be acceptable to the legal community. At the
present moment in history, the legal community wants, and insists, upon
having judicial opinions that appear to state legally compelling reasons why
the decision reached was the only decision that could have been reached
under the law. Given this insistence on the part of the legal community, it
follows that judges will present to the legal community what it wants to
read. Judges will duly deliver opinions that make it appear that the deci-
sions they reached were constrained by the law. Thus, if "law-rationaliza-
tion" is the currently preferred rhetoric, then judicial opinions will
unsurprisingly be replete with "law-rationalization." If the society were
different-if people insisted on incense-burning, animal sacrifice, and
prayer-we can imagine that judges would engage in such rituals in order
to shift the blame to the gods for their decisions. In an important aspect,
therefore, judicial candor is not what the legal community is prepared to
accept at the present time. If and when law schools leave the law business
and go into the justice business, judicial opinions may be startlingly differ-
ent from what we get at the present time. They may then contain a more
complete statement of the facts and a far fuller account of the facts of previ-
ous cases that guided the judges to the just result in the present case. They
will not contain the hocus-pocus of judges simply "finding" the law and
"applying" it to the facts in an "objective" manner. In short, we (the prac-
ticing bar) tend to get what we ask for (from the judges).
The underlying Pragmatic Indeterminacy reason that law-words do not
really constrain a judge is that the sum total of law-words is only a descrip-
tive fact. There is no normativity in these law-words that rises from the
text, so to speak, and grabs hold of the judge and says: "You ought to
decide the case this way."34 The words of the law simply exist-in books,
advance sheets, slip sheets, articles, computers, and in the oral arguments of
counsel in court. These words can be moved around like dominoes until
they are arrayed in a pretty pattern in the court's written opinion, a pattern
that satisfies the legal community's quest for sophisticated legal argument.35
33. S. FISH, supra note 7, at 388-91 (Judicial opinions are the judge's mode of self-
presentation.).
34. Legal positivists may argue that a judge must obey the commands of the legislature ex-
pressed in statutes, whether these commands are just or unjust. However, the statutes must still be
interpreted by the judge, and the judge can always attribute any result to the legislature's
command.
35. For a brief compilation of meaningless legal terms that are daily employed in instructions
to juries and in rationalizations of legal decisions, see D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture
of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 207, 214-16 (1990).
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In saying this, I do not disagree with Kent Greenawalt's observation
that "legal materials ... themselves contain explicit normative criteria."3 6
Surely most criminal prohibitions, for example, can be interpreted as nor-
mative prescriptions.3 7 Yet, the reason we know that some legal materials
contain explicit normative criteria is that we can recognize explicit norma-
tive criteria when we see them, whether or not we happen to see them en-
capsulated in legal materials. Professor Greenawalt does not tell us what
word is implied between the words "themselves" and "contain" in the sen-
tence quoted above; the implied word could be "always, .... necessarily,"
"sometimes," or "often." But the first two of these possibilities cannot be
true. It cannot be true that legal materials always or necessarily contain
explicit normative criteria of the sort that we recognize as normative. The
Nazi law "You must salute the Fuehrer" was not recognized as containing
a normative prescription by persons who despised Hitler-at best, they rec-
ognized the law as something to be obeyed only if someone else (a Gestapo
agent, for example) was looking."8 At most, legal material only contingently
recapitulates certain underlying normative criteria. The law's normative
criteria are not necessarily our own normative criteria-the kind that we
respond to by accepting the term "normative." We cannot tell from the
law-words themselves that they make a morally prescriptive claim upon us.
Rather, we must necessarily evaluate any law-words in the light of norms
that we already hold.
But law-words can sometimes, or even often, reflect justice. The follow-
ing diagram may clarify the distinctions I have been assuming between law-
words and justice.
36. Greenawalt, Book Review, 84 J. PHIL. 284, 288 (1987) (reviewing R. DWORKIN, A MAT-
TER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), and R. DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (1986)).
37. Following Kelsen, we might interpret them instead as conditional statements: "[I]f you
choose to do act X, then the state will punish you." But (I would argue) the level of normativity
changes to that of the state official, to whom the statute implicitly says, "if you find that D did act
X, then you ought to punish D." Kelson recognized this problem in what seems to me to be his
ad hoc solution (positing an overall Grundnorm). H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW
(Knight trans. 1987).
38. The post-war Nuremberg tribunal was shown in one case a horrifying example of the
enforcement of this Nazi law. An eleven-year-old child refused to give the German salute at
school. Her parents were interviewed, and it was found that they declined to influence the child to
the contrary. They pointed to a passage in the Bible: "Do nothing with an upraised hand for it
displeases the Lord." The Court of Guardians decreed on September 21, 1940, that a probation
officer should supervise the situation. The Third Reich's court ofappeals rescinded the decision of
the guardianship court, and deprived the parents of the right to look after their children on the
ground that they were not fit to bring them up. (noted in United States v. Alstoetter, Case III,




There are two circles: everything inside the first is law-words, and every-
thing inside the second is justice. The portion of the first circle denoted as
A consists of all law-words that are unjust, B consists of the law-words that
are just, and C consists of everything outside the law that is just.
Some examples of A readily come to mind: The unjust law of compul-
sory sterilization of minorities of Nuremberg in 1935, the apartheid legisla-
tion of South Africa, the antimiscegenation laws (until recently) of the
United States. But there are other laws, found in the unlikeliest places, that
are unjust. Consider this excerpt from a rule of practice of the United
States Supreme Court, prescribing that all documents fied with the Court
"shall be produced on opaque, unglazed paper 6-1/8 by 9-1/4 inches in
size, with the type matter approximately 4-1/8 by 7-1/8 inches, and mar-
gins of at least 3/4 inch on all sides."39 This kind of rule may not cause a
serious problem for large law firms that have their own printing depart-
ments. An initial order of the right sized paper and an initial configuration
of the firm's computers and printing equipment should suffice for all their
filings with the United States Supreme Court. But consider small law firms
and solo practitioners who once in a decade may have a case that goes all
the way to the United States Supreme Court." Suddenly they are faced
with the above rule. What if they can't find paper that measures exactly 6-
1/8 by 9-1/4 inches? The rule does not say that this figure is "approxi-
mate." Indeed, since the rule uses the word "approximate" in connection
with "type matter," and not in connection with paper size, any submission
of paper size not exactly 6-1/8 by 9-1/4 inches might result in bureaucratic
rejection of the entire filing by a clerk's office. Moreover, the client of the
solo practitioner or small law firm may not have the financial means to find
the exact size paper, and print it exactly so that the fastidious eyes of the
Justices will not be strained. If they find the right paper, they must submit
39. Sup. Cr. R. 33(l)(d).
40. The rules are more liberal for submissions in forma pauperis (see Sup. Cr. R. 46), but
there are many relatively poor people who are faced with court expenses and who do not quite
qualify for in forma pauperis status.
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forty copies.41 Why that many? The Supreme Court's rules are reminiscent
of the elaborate rules of court prescribed by Louise XIV of France-the
precise way a petitioner must bow or curtsy to the king, the elaborately
munificent forms of address, the oppressive and dandified courtesy. Why
do the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States require paper
exactly 6-1/8 by 9-1/4 inches before they will deign to read it? Why do
lawyers open their remarks with, "May it please the Court"? What does
pleasing the judges have to do with the merits of the case? Why do judges
expect to be called "Your Honor"? Why isn't the word "judge" good
enough for Supreme Court "Justices"?42 Why should any litigant be placed
in the posture of seeking justice as a "favor" of the court?4 3
At the risk of belaboring what is after all a trivial example, let me sug-
gest the important difference between the rule that the paper must be 6-1/8
by 9-1/8 inches, and a rule, for example, that all papers filed with the court
must be approximately 8-1/2 by 11 inches. The first rule is a stumbling
block to practitioners who are not in large law firms. It creates an unneces-
sarily precise hurdle that has no legitimate purpose, but can give rise to
clerks who do nothing more than measure with precision instruments the
size of papers that are filed in Court and smile as they ship them all back
(all forty copies) to the attorney with a form letter enclosed stating, "Sub-
mission rejected; see Rule 33."'
41. Sup. Cr. R. 12, 16.
42. Further, why doesn't the United States Supreme Court, of all institutions, respect the
words of the constitution which prohibit the granting of titles of nobility by the federal govern-
ment (article I, section 9), and by the states (article I, section 10)?
43. An individual judge may tell you that he disregards entirely the form of address and
could not even imagine being displeased by an attorney who fails to say, "May it please the court"
or "Your Honor." But then the question arises: why do highly paid attorneys persist in using
these obsequious forms of address? My guess is that they do so because they believe that judges
really will hold against them their failure to bow and scrape. I have seen many attorneys who
outside of court are boisterous macho types become groveling cowards when facing a panel of
judges, and I am certain that they do so not out of respect or because of the dignity of the sur-
roundings, but because they are trying to win for their clients, and they know that even if judges
do not respond positively to flattery they may respond negatively to attorneys who refuse to flatter
them. Ifjudges truly believe that the Louis XIV trappings should have no part in the adjudication
of cases, then they could easily interrupt attorneys who use that phraseology and make it clear
that they should not use titles of nobility in addressing the court. The practice would soon cease.
More importantly, the judges should revise their rules of practice so that attorneys who are trying
to represent clients do not have to jump through absurd hurdles such as finding 6-1/8 by 9-1/4
paper.
44. In arguing before the Seventh Circuit, I found that there were three sets of rules that I
had to contend with: the published rules of Appellate Practice, the Seventh Circuit's own pub-
lished additional rules, and a set of mimeographed supplementary rules also put out by the Sev-
enth Circuit. I found in one instance, that something that the published rules required me to put
into my brief was contradicted by the mimeographed rules. I called the Clerk of the Court and
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Contrast that with a hypothetical alternative rule: "all paper must be
approximately 8-1/2 by 11." This rule has the saving grace "approxi-
mately." Moreover, it is the currently standard paper size used in all dupli-
cating machines, printers, correspondence, and so forth. Thus it does not
present the "justice hurdle" erected by the first rule.
What about the alternative of no rule at all? Although mainstream
scholars might charge "nihilistic" indeterminists with advocating the aboli-
tion of rules, nothing could be farther from the case. For a no-rule regime
would simply result in injustice. In the particular case of the Supreme
Court rules about briefs, we might find in a no-rule regime that large law
firms with deep-pocketed clients might present their briefs on beautifully
printed paper with elaborate original leather bindings edged in gold foil.
This could give them a psychological advantage over poor persons. Thus a
rule prescribing the size of paper (roughly), the type of printing (roughly),
and the kind of binding (roughly), is necessary as a matter of justice in
order to give equal legal treatment to the rich and the poor. I would put a
rule along the lines just mentioned in the section marked, B on the diagram;
it would not only be a rule of law, but also a rule of justice, since it treats
everyone equally.
In a roughly just society in the Rawlsian sense,45 most legal rules track
justice considerations. I suspect that the vast majority of law-words in the
statutes and precedents of the United States can properly be located in sec-
tion B of the above diagram. This does not mean, of course, that the results
reached in all the cases interpreting those rules were just, for the words of
the law can be interpreted to produce either a just or an unjust result in any
asked him what I should do. He responded: "Yes, everyone has that problem. The rules are
inconsistent." He refused to give me any further advice. My "legal reasoning" was no help:
although the mimeographed rules were the last in time, and therefore might be said to supersede
any earlier, contradictory rule, the earlier rule was in fact printed, and therefore might have a
higher stature. Either way, the court had nailed me. I was going to violate one of their rules no
matter what I did.
45. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1970). Rawls' society is only roughly just. There
are many micro-injustices, but Rawls believes that overall these cancel each other out. (For exam-
ple, a steeply progressive income tax may be unjust to the rich, but if there is also a sales tax, it
operates regressively and is unjust to the poor. The two "roughly" cancel each other out.) It
follows (although the topic is far too broad to consider in the present essay) that a claim of
distributive injustice cannot, after Rawls' analysis, be fairly made in a narrow focus. A given rule
may indeed be unjust to a class of persons, but if you are litigating on the opposite side of a case,
against a person who makes such an injustice claim, it would be your job to find countervailing
rules that have a roughly equal unjust impact on your own client. The strategy can lead to re-
warding insights into macro-justice, and I could imagine a law school of the future having several
courses in distributive justice. (We now teach, almost exclusively, compensatory justice. But
compensatory justice is also "narrow" in the sense just mentioned; any claim of compensation is
not prima facie separable from a countervailing claim of distributive justice.)
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conceivable case." But it does mean that the law-words, in general, paint a
picture of social and individual justice.
As to section C, it is clear that there are many areas of life-some would
say the most important areas-that are relatively untouched by law-words.
For example, the authority of parents over their children is largely left un-
touched by the courts (though clear cases of abuse of authority, such as
child-beating or infanticide, are now considered within the province of the
legal system). Today the law does not select a spouse for a young person,
nor does it enforce an agreement to go out on a date, nor does it compel the
choice of beneficiaries of one's estate, nor does it prescribe (except in Iran
and certain other countries) religious practices for the citizens. In all of
these areas of life there are vital questions of justice and injustice; they sim-
ply are not presently regulated by the law.47
In section B of the chart, it is important to note that the law-words do
not constitute justice, but merely reflect underlying justice considerations.
Even then, they do so only under interpretations of those words that readily
come to mind. Yet, in particular contexts, our interpretations of those
words might change. A rule that looks fair on its face may be construed
unfairly. Indeed, any given law text can be misconstrued so that the under-
lying justice considerations are hidden or lost. Justice considerations are
always separate from any "law-words" or other texts that purport to encap-
sulate or reflect justice. This fact, indeed, enables us to be critical of legisla-
tion, precedents, and philosophical theories.
Apart from the question of the degree to which statutes, precedents,
rules, and regulations might encapsulate morally obligatory prescriptions,
the very encapsulation of a moral prescription in a legal text means that the
text itself will be subject to interpretation. What the interpreter reads into
the text is a function of the interpreter's values as well as the values that he
46. What could be clearer that the outright illegality, unconstitutionality, and injustice of
jailing an innocent man? Yet, in the Branion case, see infra pp. 31-35, the judge's "interpreted"
the facts so as to incarcerate a provably innocent man. Their "interpretation" amounted to mis-
interpretation and invention of facts, but the net result was that a panel of circuit court judges
solemnly condemned a provably innocent man to rot away the rest of his life in prison.
47. In fact, as a pragmatic indeterminist, I cannot quite make this claim! We can never spec-
ify exactly what areas of life are unregulated by law. Child abuse at some point became regulated
by law. In the first common-law case of regulation (where a parent clearly overstepped the
bounds of parental authority), the court's decision must have come as a surprise to the parent.
And so it will always be; the first time the law regulates something, somebody will be caught by
surprise. Hence it follows as a matter of logic that I cannot say for sure what the law will regulate
and not regulate-otherwise the one who will someday be caught by surprise will be me.
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finds to be expressed in the text.48 Surely the interpreter's own values will
color what he will "find" in the text.49
All law-words, including normative criteria expressed in the law-words,
are manipulable in this fashion. We should not be surprised since every fact
in nature can be interpreted and manipulated. Twin children growing up in
the same household, and sharing experiences can get into a fight with each
other because of their different interpretations of events. A marriage can
break up because the same set of facts has been wildly and irreconcilably
interpreted differently by husband and wife. Works of literature are notori-
ously subject to radical reinterpretation." If we look around us at the natu-
ral world, some people will interpret it as exemplifying the benign gift of
God or even as a physical part of the Deity; others, looking at the same
facts and noticing things such as the suffering and predation of innocent
animals may conclude that no benevolent God could be responsible for the
natural world. Even historical fact is constantly being upset by revisionists.
Can there be any doubt that the judge, looking at a group of precedents and
statutes, is capable of interpreting this material in a way that would favor
whichever side the judge wants to win the decision?51 Surely this capability
is available even to a judge who knows nothing about law, and has just been
48. For example, a statute may criminalize an act on "strict liability" ground, and take away
a defendant's claim of lack of intent. Nevertheless, the trier of fact could substitute her own
values into the text, either by saying: (a) Due process requires that we find intention anyway, or
(b) this defendant simply is not guilty (i.e., despite the evidence of overt acts, the compelling
defense of lack of intent has led me to find him "not guilty" as a matter of law without the need
for me to explain my finding). Often the trier of fact is unaware of substituting her own values for
the values in the text; rather, the values she happens to "find" in the text will often track her own
values simply because her own values are the values she is mentally prepared to find in the text.
49. To paraphrase Einstein, we only find in the world what our mental theories tell us we will
find. For example, in the Middle Ages (when it was believed that meteorites were rocks that
bubbled up from hell), anyone at the time who might have said that they fell from the sky would
have been branded insane because it was common knowledge that rocks were heavier than air and
thus could not be up in the sky in the first place.
50. This is Judge Posner's point about literature, but as Stanley Fish points out, it applies
equally as well to law. See R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1988); S. FISH, supra note 7, at
294-307. As a lark, I have essayed my own radical reinterpretation of Hamlet as a comedy! See
D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561,
590-92 (1989). I was not saying in that article that Hamlet "is" a comedy (Hamlet isn't anything
except words in a book), but rather that the universally received view that Hamlet is a tragedy is
itself subject to radical reinterpretation (one that colleagues who have read my article described as
"strange," and "off the wall," but notably not "nonsense").
51. Let me stress again that I am not advocating that judges should be free to make arbitrary
decisions in any given case. I only argue that the "law" does not and cannot constrain the judges.
What should constrain the judges is their sense of justice.
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elected to the bench. All he has to do is decide which side he wants to win,
and then adopt that side's brief as his "opinion."52
The sobering reality that is gaining grudging acceptance in the law-
teaching world is that no array of law-words can decide anything. All the
law-words in all the law books are just facts; they are words printed on
paper that retain their size and shape even though different people read
them-this is the irreducible "fact" about words. Since what is cannot ever
tell us what ought to be, it should not be surprising that no existential array
of "law-words" can constrain any judge in any given case."
Only normative considerations-not facts-can move a judge in the di-
rection of deciding a case one way rather than another. The judge may
recognize the law-words, cited by the attorneys, as being a repository of
normative considerations that were poured into those words in the past (for
example, the legislature was motivated by some normative considerations to
enact a statute, and what we now have are the law-words that were en-
acted). But it is also possible for the judge to believe that there are compet-
ing and more important moral considerations beyond those encapsulated in
the law-words. If a judge feels any normative constraint to decide the case
in favor of one of the parties, then that normative constraint may well be
decisive. That normative constraint does not necessarily arise out of the
law-words that were urged upon the judge by counsel. What the judge will
do, of course, is to interpret the law-words provided by counsel in such a
way as to justify the result that the judge feels ought to be reached as a
matter of justice.
None of this is to claim either that judges always decide cases according
to justice or always decide cases randomly. I am not even claiming that
judges are free to decide cases any way they choose, if we interpret "free" in
a moral sense. Most judges may well want the party with the more just
cause to prevail. In many cases, the justice of the cause may coincide with
the judge's interpretation of the law-words. Saying that the judge can pick
either side to win, irrespective of the words of law, does not mean that
judges in fact decide cases arbitrarily. I believe that many judges feel them-
selves constrairned by their sense of justice. I only claim that we should be
teaching students how to marshal and structure the facts of cases in order
52. Traditionalists believe that if the judge chooses the "wrong" brief he will be reversed on
appeal. This pious hope is not supportable by any empirical evidence. The appellate court is not
necessarily better at selecting the "right" brief.
53. Not to mention the fact that each case contains two opposing briefs, each stating force-
fully that the law compels a decision in its favor. A judge who secretly decided cases by flipping a
coin might never be found out! All that judge has to do is to adopt the brief of the side that wins
the coin toss, and no one will be the wiser.
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to get through to the judge's sense of justice. 4 To ignore, relativize, or
factor out the "justice" goal and instead spend three years teaching our
students law-words amounts simply to providing them with tools that a
judge can employ to make a pretty pattern that rationalizes (the rationaliza-
tion, of course, takes the forms of more law-words) a decision for whichever
side the judge has chosen to win the case. The ability of judges to inter-
pret facts and law to let either side win in any case is the way the world is
(and not the way that I or anyone else might want the world to be). If we
are looking for constraints upon judges, we have to look in areas where law
school education does not now look. Law school education looks at the
content of the law, which is precisely the wrong place to find any con-
straints. It is a massive, yet societally well-entrenched illusion, to think that
the content of the law actually constrains any judge in any particular case.
Thus, the present crisis in legal education can be summarized as follows.
As we become increasingly aware that the words of the law do not con-
strain judges in deciding cases, we get the sickening feeling that the entire
legal content of what we teach our students for three years also does not
matter. No matter what that legal content may be, it will not compel a
judge in the future to decide any given case any given way. Some professors
fight back by retreating to full-blown formalism. They attempt to teach
their classes as if the words of the law determine the correct result in every
case. (They buttress this conviction by the spinning of theories and policy
arguments.) This is a somewhat desperate attempt to deal with the crisis in
law school education. It is doomed to fail both because it is incorrect (for-
malism does not and cannot work),56 and because some, many, or most of
54. My colleague John Elson, commenting on a draft of this Article, said "the strategic devel-
opment of facts in litigation is one of the most critical lawyering skills and one that law schools
pay almost no attention to outside of live-client clinics." Communication from Professor Elson
(January 14, 1991).
55. For example, a statute may have a preamble explaining its policy and goals. If the judge
called upon to "apply" that statute disagrees with those policies and goals, the judge merely has to
write that he agrees with them but that the legislature did not intend the policies to apply beyond
the scope of the statute itself. The judge adds that the facts of the present case (as interpreted and
selected, of course, by the judge) do not constitute an instance of that policy (expressed, perhaps,
in other statutes that also "apply" to the present case). Finally, any policy statement, like any
theory, can be interpreted to apply to either side of any given case. See A. D'AMATO, JURISPRU-
DENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 84-88 (1984) (discussing policy);
D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513
(1989).
56. See, e.g., D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged Presi-
dent, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 250 (1990); D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word
"Bird," 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 536 (1990); D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Thought Control in
Xanadu, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 1086 (1990); D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeter-
minacy With One Bold Thought, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 113 (1990).
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the professors who try it are not inwardly convinced, and their lack of con-
viction seeps through to their students.
If you accept Pragmatic Indeterminacy, it follows that law schools
should not be teaching law. 7 Law is only a tool, a language; it simply
exists; it is a description of what legislatures have enacted and courts have
decided. There is no point learning it because any judge in any case can
reinterpret or misinterpret it differently from the way you interpreted it
when you learned it. There is no reason to spend three years teaching stu-
dents the descriptive content of law. It would be like teaching theology by
studying the vestments that priests wear.
Does indeterminacy depress me? Quite the opposite! I know now that
the entire formalist claim is an illusion. I do not long for the good old days
when law could be taught formalistically, because no matter how intellectu-
ally satisfying those days seemed to be at the time, in retrospect they con-
sisted of spinning tautologies that had no relation to the very thing that we
insisted in the classrooms that law did-namely, constraining judges to de-
cide cases according to the law. We used to analyze the law and ask the
students whether the judge reached the "right" decision. Our notion of
"right" was Dworkin's notion-that the "right answer" could be found in
the legal materials. We failed to realize that "right" has a normative mean-
ing that cannot be derived from a legal text. I look back on my class-prepa-
ration notes of the 1970s and see with dismay how caught up I was in the
policy and theory argumentation of the times. I had no clear notion then
that such talk was nothing more than illusion and rhetoric and that I was
subconsciously selecting my favorite theories and policies to fit what I had
subconsciously decided was the just result. I did not know then, as I know
now, that even when one chooses a theory or policy to fit a line of cases,
there are waiting in the wings to be discovered a plethora of other compet-
ing theories and policies, each of which had equivalent explanatory power.
As Skolem and Lowenheim found in the 1920s with respect to mathemat-
ics, there is no end to theories that can "explain" any mathematical result
57. One of the most respected spokespersons in the law school world on the subject of law
teaching, Francis Allen, says: "The farther law school scholarship strays from the law as a source
of values and methodology, the more unlikely it becomes that it will influence the behavior of legal
institutions." Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
403, 404 (1983). Professor Allen is imprisoned in law-words. He is upset by new challenges to the
verities of the law. Thus he resorts to a belief that if legal scholarship changes from its formalistic
traditions, it will be ignored by judges. What he apparently cannot understand is that formalist
legal scholarship is already, and has always been, ignored by judges. But even if he understood
this, he would still have to explain why law is a source of values. Surely laws can be evil and
unjust-what values find their sources in such laws? As for law being a source of methodology-
well, what can that possibly mean?
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you want to reach.58 By extending the Skolem-Lowenheim result to ordi-
nary English-which is essentially what Wittgenstein accomplished-we
find that whatever the explanatory theory or policy, there is an infinity of
other equally explanatory theories and policies that are inconsistent with
the one you started with.59 When we construct an "ingenious" theory of
law (for example, in a law review article), we may believe that we have
finally explained a case or a line of cases. In fact, sooner or later another
scholar comes along with a different theory that explains the same cases."
Not only is there an endless supply of theories that will explain any
given set of facts in different ways, but it is also true that the same theory
can account for opposite judicial outcomes in any given case. This latter
proposition, of course, cannot be demonstrated as to each theory that could
ever be imagined in all the reported cases in human history-the task would
take forever-but I have recently presented a general algorithm for reach-
ing this result in eight different (and probably mutually exclusive) catego-
ries of theories.6" A decade earlier I had suggested in a less rigorous way
the opposing conclusions that could always be drawn from any "policy"
standard or "standard of social desirability."'62
I have personally come to the conclusion that the construction of theo-
ries to explain the law ends in a blind alley, even though theory-spinning
may well be an enjoyable and intellectually stimulating pastime. This is not
to say that theorizing in general should be abandoned. Indeed, as Einstein
and many others have pointed out, we can only "see" the world through the
theories we have in our minds that precondition us to expect to see certain
58. This follows from the Skolem-Lowenheim demonstration in mathematics of the early
1920s. See the extended footnote discussions in D'Amato, supra note 50, at 597 n.96, 599 n.102.
Professor Kress has objected that the English language is not like mathematical language and
hence the Skolem-Lowenheim theories do not apply to English; see Kress, A Preface to Epistemo-
logical Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 133, 144 (1990), for a reply, see D'Amato, supra note
20, at 176 n.92. But even if we put aside Skolem-Lowenheim, Wittgenstein has shown that the
very idea of "following a rule" is indeterminate inasmuch as whatever set of facts is given, there
are infinitely many rules that the facts can be shown to exemplify. See generally S. KRIPKE, supra
note 25; L. WITTGENSTEIN, WITTGENSTEIN'S LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHE-
MATICS (C. Diamond ed. 1976).
59. "Indeterminacy" means not that there is no acceptable explanatory theory but that there
are many. Cf. Quine, Indeterminacy of Translation Again, 84 J. PHIL. 5, 9 (1987).
60. Scholars generally accept the demolition of their own theories gracefully. After all, the
new theory is good academic publicity for the old.
61. See D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 513 (1989).
62. See D'Amato, Judicial Legislation, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 63 (1979), reprinted in A.




things and not others.63 We need to be conscious of the way theories shape
and sometimes distort, our own vision. We even need to be aware of the
role that theories, including legal theories, may play in shaping and some-
times distorting the attitudes that judges bring to their task of deciding
cases. All that Pragmatic Indeterminacy says is that no collection of law-
words (including theories about law-words) will ever constrain a judge in
any given case to decide the case one way rather than the other.
When I was finally prepared to sweep out of my own mind the meta-
physical cobwebs of formalism," I saw a new and liberating potential for
law school education. Instead of fooling ourselves that judges are con-
strained by the law, we would open our minds to the stark reality of judicial
decision-making. We would see what is really going on in the courts. Law,
as the late Robert Cover said, is conducted on a field of "pain and death."65
There is a brute force in judicial decision-making that gives it, for some
people, its "authority"-namely, that whether you like it or not, the state
will physically enforce the judgment reached by the court. The court's final
judgment is the reality, and everything that precedes it is words. The only
way we can criticize the court's final judgment-that is, the only way that
makes any sense and is worthy of our time and effort-is to criticize it from
the normative standpoint of justice. Fortunately, it remains open to us to
say whether a given decision is fair or unfair. In asking the justice question,
we uncover new avenues for criticizing counsels' performance in the case,
and learn better lawyering strategies in the process.
It is worth reemphasizing my previous point that we should not spend
our time and effort arguing whether a given decision is right or wrong ac-
cording to the law. For the "right answer" in the Dworkinian sense of the
legally right answer is a complete illusion. It blinds us to the truth. The
truth is that a case is decided either justly or unjustly. Those are the only
two real alternatives: Has the person won who morally should have won,
or has the other side won by a combination of legal trickery and judicial
misfeasance? In contrast, the Dworkinian approach leads to an endless
63. As Mary Jane Morrison puts it, "we do not have theory-independent ways of assessing
what 'the facts' are." Morrison, Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 271, 195 (1989). See also supra note 49.
64. I was, of course, aided greatly by the writings of legal scholars as well as by my own
continuing interest and study in relativity and quantum theory and the work of Wittgenstein.
Two of my earlier essays that now look to me like rattletrap bridges between the old formalism
and the new indeterminacy are D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983), and
D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE L.J. 468 (1978). But my own personal water-
shed was the experience I had in federal court in the Branion case. See infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
65. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
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search into legal texts, a truly Herculean task.6 6 And even at the end of the
task, Judge Hercules will find deep contradictions in the underlying polit-
ical theories that will allow reasonable judges (who have undertaken the
same laborious research) to differ utterly in their conclusions. Legal for-
malism is simply words chasing other words.
Many clear-minded lay observers throughout history have concluded
that justice and injustice are all that matter in a legal system. The person
on the street is apt to be skeptical about lawyers who simply know how to
twist the meaning of words. Underworld slang for attorney is "mouth-
piece." Many novelists have shown how legalism can be employed in the
service of state oppression. Historians have explained how the arcane
processes of trials and inquisitions have been perverted to serve the ends of
the state or, more specifically, the ends of a group of persons who are in
effective control of the state at a given time. The grossest forms of injustice
can be given the patina of legality by the solemnities of law-words spoken in
official settings.67 Public prosecutors and defense attorneys can lose sight of
justice and, in cowardice induced by the relativity of law-words, can be-
come capable of unfairness so perverse that they fail to recognize how un-
fair they have become.68
How capable of injustice are our present judges? Is there not a threshold
problem of defining injustice? I had the unfortunate experience of seeing
pure injustice at first hand, perpetrated by honored and nationally re-
nowned federal court judges. In the experience I shall briefly describe,
66. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
67. Compare what Judge Richard Posner says about the role of a judge. A judge is "a deci-
sion maker in a system of government, and such a decision maker must be concerned not only
with doing substantive justice in the case at hand but also with maintaining a legal fabric that
includes considerations of precedent, of legislative authority, of the framing of issues by counsel,
of the facts of record, and so forth." R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 156-57
(1990). I regard this notion of "maintaining a legal fabric" as hocus-pocus in the same category as
witchcraft. What is remarkable about Judge Posner's sentence is its explicit justification of plac-
ing substantive justice on an equal level with legal (i.e., law-word) appearances. Of course, on a
deeper level, any articulate judge is capable of keeping up legal appearances irrespective of which
side wins the case. Hence, Judge Posner's sentence is a mumbo-jumbo justification for allocating
to judges an arbitrary power to decide a given case either in accordance with or in violation of
substantive justice.
68. See R. WIESBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984). For example, an attorney in
Texas makes a substantial contribution to a state judge's election campaign; the judge is elected;
and the attorney appears in the judge's courtroom arguing an important case. The judge may very
well think, "I owe this attorney something because he helped me get this job," and thereupon
award the attorney the decision. See Sixty Minutes: Justice for Sale? (CBS television broadcast,
Dec. 6, 1987) (discussing the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation). The judge's sense of "owing" the attor-
ney something is normative, but except in a very narrow sense (justice requires that we repay
favors) it is clearly unjust to the parties in the litigation.
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there is no definitional problem. There is no indeterminacy about what was
just and what was unjust. The case is about a provably innocent man whom
the judges, for their own reasons, refused to free from prison. The judges'
decision-to cage this man for the remainder of his life, like an animal in a
cell-is, I state with confidence, incontrovertibly unjust.
Five years ago I was asked to take on a pro bono case-the case of Dr.
John Marshall Branion. He worked at a hospital, and three days before
Christmas, 1967, he left the hospital at 11:30 a.m. and picked up his four-
year-old son Joby at a nursery school. They went home for lunch only to
find Mrs. Branion brutally murdered. Dr. Branion summoned neighbors
who called the police. A next-door neighbor told the police that she had
heard shots at about 11:20 a.m. and no later than 11:25 a.m.. The detec-
tives also determined from their investigations that Dr. Branion was in the
hospital at that time-a mile and a half away from his home. Dr. Branion
saw his last patient of the morning at 11:27 a.m. Dr. Branion was briefly
questioned and then informed that he was not a suspect in the murder.
A month later, after futile efforts to find the killer or killers, the Illinois
State's Attorney's office decided to indict Dr. Branion for the crime of mur-
dering his wife Donna. They had no evidence against him. There was no
financial motive. 69 But the state wanted to "nail" Dr. Branion because the
State's Attorney hated him for his role in the civil rights movement of the
1960s, specifically for treating gunshot wounds of civil-rights activists
(wounds inflicted by the police) without reporting the names of his patients
to the police. Another reason for prosecuting him was to quiet the public,
which was agitated about the failure of the police to apprehend the killer of
Donna Branion (she came from a socially prominent family, and the mur-
der made local headlines).
Unlike The Thin Blue Line (a movie that came out many years later in
which the prosecutor suborned witnesses to give false testimony against an
innocent defendant), the Branion trial was fair. The prosecutor put the
earwitness on the stand, and she told the jury that she heard the shots no
later that 11:25 a.m. She gave her evidence for the state, and what she said
went uncontroverted. The prosecutor informed the jury that Dr. Branion
(who did not take the stand) left the hospital at 11:30 a.m. But despite the
clear impossibility of Dr. Branion's having murdered his wife no later that
11:25 a.m. when at the time he was seeing patients at a hospital a mile and a
half away-and did not leave the hospital until 11:30 a.m.-Dr. Branion's
69. In fact, there was a reverse financial motive. Dr. Branion's wife would have inherited a
fortune had she stayed alive and outlived her father, Sydney Brown. Mr. Brown, who died a few
years later, was one of the wealthiest blacks in the United States.
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defense attorney did not pound this "impossibility defense" home to the
jury, and the prosecutor did a clever job of confusing the jury and built a
highly emotional case against Dr. Branion. The prosecutor was helped by
the fact that at the time of the trial Chicago was racked with civil-rights
riots and burnings-it had been a month after Martin Luther King was
assassinated. The jury of eleven whites and one middle-aged black woman
returned a verdict of guilty.
When I found the transcript of the trial,7° I decided to pursue a habeas
remedy in federal court. The transcript made it crystal clear that on the
basis of the state's own evidence-none of which was challenged in any way
by either side-it was physically impossible for Dr. Branion to have com-
mitted the crime. He was a mile and a half away from the scene of the
crime treating patients at a hospital. I felt that all I had to do was state this
evidence clearly and present it to a federal court. The judges would surely
free Dr. Branion forthwith, and a gross miscarriage of justice would finally
be righted.
I was utterly unprepared for the spectacle of federal judges deliberately
distorting and misstating the record evidence. I was unprepared for federal
judges manipulating and inventing facts. The district court7' and the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals denied habeas relief-not on any "legal"
grounds that an innocent person who has been convicted by a jury should
remain in prison (for whatever reason), but on the factual ground that a
rational jury had enough evidence to find Dr. Branion guilty of murdering
his wife. 72 Dr. Branion was a sick man at the time of these federal appeals
and subsequently died in the prison hospital.73
To present a factual case against Dr. Branion, the court of appeals had
to do something with the earwitness's testimony. What the court did was to
omit this testimony from its statement of the facts!74 By such an omission,
the court could suggest that it was possible for Dr. Branion to have commit-
ted the crime after he left the hospital at 11:30 a.m. The shots heard by the
70. All copies were apparently lost. But, after extensive effort, one copy turned up in the
vaults of the Supreme Court of the United States.
71. Branion v. Gramly, No. 87-3052, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1987) (WESTLAW®), reconsidera-
tion denied, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1987) (WESTLAW®).
72. Branion v. Granly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, No. 87-3052 (Sept. 2,
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
73. While Dr. Branion was on his death bed and unable to speak coherently, Governor
Thompson-responding to the public outrage about the case that had been depicted on several
national and local television programs--commuted his sentence to time served. He died within a
month in the hospital bed.
74. There is a brief reference in another context in the circuit court's opinion to "commotion"
heard by the next-door neighbor. For an analysis, see D'Amato, supra note 22, at 1325.
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next-door-neighbor no later than 11:25 a.m. became a nonfact. At trial, the
state had presented the uncontroverted evidence of its own witness that the
shots were heard before Branion left the hospital. In a circumstantial evi-
dence case, the state has the burden of proving opportunity. At the Branion
trial, the state-remarkably-proved that there was no opportunity. What
the federal judges did on habeas was simply to take away-by not mention-
ing it-the state's own proof that there was no opportunity. Thus the
reader of the federal court opinion might assume that there was opportu-
nity. If the reader of the opinion is simply not told by the federal judges
that Dr. Branion was treating patients in a hospital at 11:25 a.m. at the time
his wife was murdered a mile and a half away from the hospital, then the
reader would not conclude that it was physically impossible for Dr. Branion
to have murdered his wife. Hence the reader might go on to assume that
Dr. Branion could have murdered his wife. Once the reader assumes that,
the reader might be persuaded by the federal judges that the jury could
reasonably have found Dr. Branion to be guilty. End of case.75
I gave a paper on the Branion case for the Derrida Conference in New
York in October, 1989, and the paper was reported in the New York
Times.76 Judge Frank Easterbrook, who wrote the opinion for the Seventh
Circuit, was asked to respond, but he told the Times that anything he had
to say he had already said in his published opinion. He added that he "put
a lot of time into writing that opinion."7 7 I also presented the paper to the
Inns of Court of Chicago, consisting of leading members of the Chicago
bar; and Judge Easterbrook was invited to come and debate me, but he
declined to attend. My paper was recently published in the Cardozo Law
Review," and I will not attempt to recapitulate it here. A brief summary of
the paper was given by Professor Monroe Freedman in a recent issue of
Legal Times.79
I learned several bitter but eye-opening lessons from the Branion case:
1. If lower-court judges change facts, no appellate court has any inter-
est in reviewing the case. Appellate courts (like law schools, like law
professors) only care about legal questions; never mind that "legal" ques-
tions are infinitely elusive, unreal, and indeterminate. When appellate
judges were students in law schools, they were taught that only the "law" is
interesting, not the "facts," and that lesson unfortunately was well ab-
75. There is, of course, much more to the story than the skeletal outline I have presented
here. For a full account, see D'Amato, supra note 22.
76. Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1989.
77. Id. at B5, col. 2.
78. See D'Amato, supra note 22.
79. Freedman, When Judges Tamper With the Evidence, Legal Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at 24.
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sorbed. If law schools focused upon justice, they would have a high regard
for facts; instead, law schools disregard facts. Does the Branion case break
any new legal ground? No. Did anyone care? No (except for Dr. Branion).
2. Since judges can and do change the facts, it is crystal clear that law-
words cannot constrain the way judges decide cases. Dr. Branion's is the
most extreme and conspicuous case. How can our legal system produce a
result such that a person proven to be innocent is left to rot in jail? I exper-
ienced this tragedy as Dr. Branion's attorney. If federal judges can engage
in this monstrous perversion of justice and condemn Dr. Branion to prison,
they can do anything they want to anybody at any time in any case. The
"law" is no safeguard. It is illusory to pin your hopes on the law. Our only
possible safeguard from becoming victimized by the law, as Dr. Branion
was, is to make sure that only fair and honorable persons are selected to be
judges8 0
3. A judge who cares nothing for the life or freedom of demonstrably
innocent persons accused of a crime can get away scot-free with judgments
that condemn such persons to prison. The judge can simply make up a
story that the defendant is guilty and solemnly tell that story to the public
in the form of a judicial opinion. No matter: the judge will still be vener-
ated in the public media, the judge will still be invited to law schools to give
occasional lectures and judge moot-court competitions, and the judge's
every word will be taken seriously by an admiring coterie of law students
(who aspire to clerk for the judge), law professors, and practitioners. The
judge will clink glasses at a cocktail party of law school alumni and bask in
the deference that others give to his exalted position of public trust. Com-
pare the judge to Dr. Branion. A judge can be a political appointee to the
bench who has never done anything noteworthy in his life. Dr. Branion
earned three medals in World War II in a segregated black South Pacific
army medical unit; he mastered five languages; he obtained a medical de-
gree in Switzerland where he had to learn French and German to under-
stand the lectures and the reading; he participated, at great personal risk, in
the famous black civil rights housing marches in Chicago; he marched
80. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari in the Branion case, even
though my argument was based upon the distortions and inventions of fact by the Seventh Circuit.
Two lessons may be derived from the denial of certiorari. First, the Supreme Court Judges no
longer care about the life or freedom of an individual; they only deal with cases that have broad
social consequences irrespective of the amount of injustice that may have been suffered by any
person. For an expansion of this position, see D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting In-
determinacy With One Bold Thought, 85 Nw. U.L. REv. 113 (1990). Second, Supreme Court
Judges are jaded; they either go along with this outrage or have decided that they do not want to
waste their time attempting to correct the practice.
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alongside Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and served as Dr. King's personal
physician. When his wife was brutally murdered, the legal system re-
sponded by incarcerating him and leaving him to die in a prison hospital.
Dr. Branion is dead, but the federal judges who were morally responsible
continue to enjoy the highest social status and esteem. These judges only
actualized methods they learned in law school: that appearance is more
important than substance, that legal rationalization is more important than
justification, and that legal rhetoric is the key to ultimate power-the heady
power to command the overwhelming resources of the state to punish the
guilty or the innocent. Such judges are the examples of a legal education
that has no soul.
It is time for a sea change in the way we teach law.
III. THE FUTURE
The change I advocate, stated in its simplest and perhaps most contro-
versial manner, is that law schools should stop teaching law. Instead, we
should teach justice. Justice is the purpose and goal of law. It is the reason
the law exists. It animates and breathes life into the law. The professional
calling of a lawyer is to help achieve justice in society. The skill of an advo-
cate is the ability to convince a judge that his client's cause is a just one and
his client should win the lawsuit. The role of a judge is to decide cases
justly. Since the judge is presented with plausible legal arguments from
both sides, the judge will usually pick the side that she believes ought to
win."' This "ought" is a moral imperative and is part of her sense of justice.
It is not a legal imperative except to the extent that the judge feels that one
side's interpretation of the law is coincident with the dictates of justice.
When the judge couches her opinion in terms of "law" (which is indeed the
presently acceptable way of presenting a judicial opinion to the legal com-
munity), we can interpret her opinion as showing that she has chosen the
more deeply sound legal position by using justice as a guide to the choice
81. Of course, judges do not necessarily decide cases according to their sense of justice. The
possibility always exists that bribery, corruption, political dealing, conflict of interest, and preju-
dice can eclipse for a judge the dictates ofjustice. See G. SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE 101-
02 (1989) ("I saw a judge throw out the just case of a widow whose husband had been murdered
because the jury's verdict would have been an embarrassment to the governor who had appointed
him. I saw a judge permit the prosecution of an innocent man because the man was unpopular in
the judge's club."). Some judges are unaware of the malleability of the law, and reach results that
they admit are unjust because-as they put it-the "law" compelled that result. But Pragmatic
Indeterminacy says that the law cannot compel any result. A judge who says so either is fooled by
the law (as advanced by the more clever advocate in the case) or is being disingenuous.
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between the two conflicting legal arguments presented by the parties to the
court.
Justice, of course, is not entirely absent from the law school curriculum.
It peeks in now and then, and the students absorb some of it by osmosis.
Professors will often spend time discussing which result in a case is "fair."
Often the answer cannot be found because the critical facts of the case are
not stated in the court's opinion. However, in the main, the present law
school curriculum is devoted to imparting to the students descriptive
knowledge of rules of law. Each course is slightly different in content, just
as the priest wears different vestments for high mass, low mass, and special
functions. Students are trained to become verbally adept at manipulating
rules in a variety of legal specialties.
But the enterprise is hardly ennobling. A student trained in manipulat-
ing rules is no more likely to take up a career in serving the public than in
cheating the public. We train our students to shoot, and some of them
become legal gunslingers. We rationalize this endeavor to ourselves by
thinking that at least if there are two lawyers in every case, the "truth" will
come out. But we also know down deep that the clever lawyer and not the
one with truth on her side will usually win. In fact, some of the cleverest
lawyers are in the employ of the most affluent persons and corporations,
and it is their job to make their clients even more wealthy. Truth and jus-
tice do not necessarily have anything to do with such a task.
At present, law schools primarily teach the facility of manipulating law-
words so students may utilize these words in presenting arguments in court,
in negotiation sessions, or in structuring a client's deals. Since we teach
law-words interchangeably for P and D, the purposes P and D might have,
get canceled out. We simply assume that Patricia calls an attorney's office
and says: "This is what I need." Then, the attorney starts the meter run-
ning. We simply assume that David walks into an attorney's office and says
the same thing. Then Patricia sues David, and money flows from each of
them to their respective attorneys. To be sure, we often suggest that the
attorney has a loftier role. The attorney might say: "Are you sure you
want what you say you want," or "If you consider changing your prefer-
ences, it may cost you less and save you future grief." But for the most
part, law schools are indifferent as to the comparative truth or justice of any
potential client's cause.
Even though clever lawyering may have little to do with justice or truth,
I am not for a moment arguing that the adversary system itself derails us
from the search for truth. I disagree totally with Anthony Kronman who,
in a much discussed article, claims that teaching advocacy in law schools
entails an "indifference to truth that.., is likely ... to affect the character
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of one who practices the craft for a long time and in a studied way." 2
What is lawyering apart from advocacy? If we fail to teach advocacy to our
students, what relation will law school possibly have to what our students
will be doing for the rest of their professional lives? Professor Kronman has
selected the wrong target. It is not training in advocacy that leads to an
indifference to truth, but rather it is the failure--4n the course of teaching
advocacy-to consider the comparative justice of opposing claims that leads
not only to indifference to truth, but to general moral relativism. Quite the
opposite of what Professor Kronman says, I believe that law schools need to
sharpen their students' ability to be advocates. Successful advocacy will
entail, in my view, ferreting out the factual basis in justice for their client's
claims, and organizing and presenting those facts so as to elicit resonance
with the decision-maker's sense of justice.
One may object: What if in a given case P's claim happens to be just
and D's claim happens to be unjust? How can a law school train students
to be an advocate of D's position when that would amount to instructing
students to win for an unjust position? In the first place, I would say that it
is extremely rare for one side of a case to have a purely unjust position. I
encountered such a rarity in the case of Dr. Branion. 3 In that case, the
only moral approach would have been to urge the state to desist from prose-
cuting Dr. Branion. His case was simply one in which there were not "two
sides" to the question of whether an innocent man should be incarcerated.84
In any event, in most cases, what appears to be the comparatively unjust
side of a case will have its own justificatory elements. These elements may
have to be sought out by counsel; there may be "hidden facts" that have to
be brought to light to explain why D did what he did and why P is not
100% right.85 In law school, no matter how extensively the facts of a case
may be presented in a casebook, there are still unknown and perhaps un-
knowable facts. These facts can make up a host of "what if" questions.
Additionally, the facts as presented can be interpreted. Students may argue
either side of a case in a classroom by interpreting the given facts in a differ-
82. Kronman, Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 964 (1981).
83. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
84. But even this proposition is possibly indeterminate. I have suggested a utilitarian justifi-
cation for incarcerating an innocent man. See, D'AmatoThe Ultimate Injustice: When a Court
Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1333 n.59 (1990). Since I don't personally believe
that utilitarianism is a moral position, I am hardly in a position to suggest that the utilitarian
justification I outlined in that article is really a "justification." But I of course recognize that
utilitarians may sincerely believe that their position is a moral one. See, e.g., H. SIDGWICK, THE
METHODS OF ETHICS (1874).




ent light. (This happens all the time in the moot-court hypothetical exer-
cises I use in my course in International Law.) 6 The result finally reached
should be the one that is comparatively the more just. But along the road
to reaching that decision, many competing "justice-factors" can be taken
into account and assessed.
In brief, training in advocacy is not only possible in law schools, it is
desirable-so long as the training does not reduce to a question of which
side is slicker and more glib in rattling off sophisticated legal arguments. As
long as we keep the goal of searching for the just solution in mind (even if
there is a great difference of opinion in the classroom about which position
is the more just), then I do not believe that advocacy training can produce
an indifference to truth. Just the opposite can occur. Advocacy training in
the search for the just solution can help us collectively converge upon truth.
Through our hands as professors of law pass some of future society's
most important people. We have three years of their lives to make an im-
pression on them. Then they will leave us and take up "the law," whether
in politics, in business, in private practice, or on the bench. They will influ-
ence and, in some cases, judge or govern our society. If we teach them
merely how to understand, use, and manipulate law-words, there is no
doubt that they will use these tools to whatever ends they choose. But why
do we take such a stunted view of our role as their teachers? Why do we
think that we must impart to them and implant in them more and more
rules of law? No one is forcing us to teach students rules. We should use
the three years of law school to pry open these rules. We should hold up
hundreds of cases to the light of legal rules (even if that light is dim and
glancing) to see whether a superficial interpretation of those legal rules
would lead to an unfair decision in those cases. If it would, then we should
teach ways of reinterpreting those rules in light of an assumed legislative
purpose to be just, as well as ways of looking for additional facts in the
richness of the factual settings of those cases. s7 We should reinterpret rules
in light of the sense of justice that emerges in the classroom discussion, as
well as looking for more facts as that sense of justice dictates. In doing so,
86. See supra note 13.
87. I believe that there is nothing wrong with reinterpreting rules in the interest of justice and
everything wrong with reinterpreting them in the interest of injustice. The legal formalist may
reply: why reinterpret the rules at all? Why not just interpret them the way they were meant to
be interpreted? But those questions are precisely what is wrong with legal formalism. Rules are
never just interpreted; there is no such thing as a plain interpretation of a rule. There is no such
thing as the sanctity or integrity of a rule. See generally S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATU-




we will be helping to shape our students' abilities to search for and articu-
late the normatively persuasive facts in their future clients' claims to a just
and fair legal decision. If our students do that in their practice, they should
achieve greater success as advocates.
What is the content of this sense of justice? After perusing much that
has been written on justice, including philosophical, legal, sociological, and
psychological books and articles, I have come to the conclusion that no one
will ever be able to tell us what constitutes justice. For I believe that justice
does not have a "content" that can ever be expressed in words. My conclu-
sion is not a negative one, but is, perhaps surprisingly, optimistic. For if
anyone could state the content of justice in a Text, then the Text itself
would be subject to interpretation, misinterpretation, application, and mis-
application. The Justice Text would become just one more set of words. 8
Suppose that a nation simply enacts the Justice Text as its basic law.
Would law and justice then be fused? Clearly not; the Justice Text would
be nothing more nor less than law-words, and thus it would be subject to
our interpretation or misinterpretation in the light of our sense of justice!
(There is also a second reason: general statements about justice can never
solve specific cases.)89 My conclusion is simply that justice cannot, by its
nature, ever be reduced to words.90
But that is a far cry from saying that justice is a purely subjective notion
lacking in content. If justice lacked content and were purely subjective, the
following claim might be controversial: "It is clearly unjust for a judge to
knowingly incarcerate an innocent man." But I doubt whether anyone
would dispute that claim. I doubt whether anyone would say that Dr. Bra-
nion, in the case I described earlier, was justly denied habeas relief despite
the fact that he was provably innocent.9 The fact is that we all share a
great deal of common ground in our assessment of justice claims. I call this
common ground our sense of justice. It may not be expressible in a text, but
88. Consider the history of using the Bible as a justice text. One would have to then accept
the Old Testament view that children who disobey their parents should be stoned to death. One
would have to accept the wild misinterpretations that have been given to Biblical phrases. As
Shakespeare wrote, "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant
of Venice, Act I, sc. III. For an account of Milton's ingenious reinterpretation of the of the New
Testament's attitude toward divorce, see S. FISH, supra note 87 at 8-9.
89. Cf J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS (1966).
90. For further discussion, see the chapter entitled "Justice" in A. D'AMATO, HoW TO UN-
DERSTAND THE LAW 141 (1989).
91. To be sure, a person who believes in utilitarianism as a principle ofjustice might fashion
an argument that would deny habeas relief to a provably innocent person. I have constructed
such an argument in my essay on the Branion case. See D'Amato, supra note 84. Even if the
argument is accepted (I don't accept it), it would still be difficult to argue that justice to Dr.
Branion himself was served by the denial of habeas relief.
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it exists. Indeed, its existence is one of the things that we are most sure
about in this uncertain world.
If we cannot teach students what justice is, or even pick out justice rules
from a given legal or philosophical text, we can do the next best thing by
considering the epistemology of justice. This epistemology is, I contend,
common to the experiences of all or nearly all of our students.
To begin, it is clear that we did not obtain our sense of justice from
definitions of justice or theories of justice. We have a sense of justice, but
we learned it in a different way. We learned it by observing, hearing, and
reading about hundreds of thousands of incidents and how they were re-
solved. We started at a very early age. We saw how our parents made
decisions, and we soon learned what was "fair" and what was not. We saw
how our playmates behaved and often argued questions of fairness in the
playing of games. We were read stories of just decisions in the Bible; we
heard sermons about incidents that were fairly decided; we saw and heard
many stories about decisions that were unfair (and we drew conclusions in
our minds about what would have been the fair decision). We heard our
relatives and friends talking all the time about who was unfair to whom.
"Justice" is the conclusion we reached about how competing claims in the
stories we heard (or the daily incidents we participated in) were fairly re-
solved so that the outcomes were stable and accepted. By the age of ten we
already had a highly developed sense of fairness and justice, and by the time
we went to law school that sense of justice had been sharpened and made
more sophisticated through our additional years of reading, listening, and
experiencing.
92
It would be impossible to recall all the stories we have heard in our lives
that make up our memory bank of "justice" incidents. Each person, of
course, has a different constellation of stories. But the fact is that many of
these stories overlap, and the "justice" outcomes are fairly stable across
stories and across minds. Each year I try the following simple experiment
on my students in my course on Justice, and every time I get the same
unanimous answers:
A mother of two children cuts the dessert cake; she hands a large piece to
Jane and a small piece to Tom. Is this just or unjust? (Unanimous answer:
Unjust, in the absence of a reasonable explanation.)
92. Perhaps our sense of justice was even more acute when we were ten years old than when
we became adults. For in our childhood we had to think about justice all the time in our relations
with our parents, siblings, and friends. Those were intensely personal encounters with justice.
Later, we began to think of justice in more abstract terms, and perhaps we unlearned some of the
basics and lost some empathy in the process.
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Now consider each of the following explanations that the mother might
offer:
Examples:
(a) "I like Jane more."
(b) "Jane is a girl."
(c) "Jane is cute; Tom is
plain looking."
(d) "The doctor put Tom
on a low sugar diet."
(e) "Because it's
Tuesday.
(f) "Tom hates cake."
(g) "They've got to learn
that the world isn't
fair."
Answers Given:




Just, but there should be some
corresponding compensation for
Tom.
Unjust, unless the mother is
alternating days of the week, so that
on Wednesday, for example, Tom
gets the bigger piece of cake.
Just.
Unjust.
I suspect that as you read these examples you agreed with all or most of the
answers. Note that, presumably, the "cake" example was a new one-espe-
cially with the variations I proposed-to the students who have participated
in this experiment. Presumably you have not previously though of it-at
least with these variations. Yet the students' answers (and yours) are
congruent.
In addition, consider your mental processes as you answered the above
points. Did you consciously apply some theory or conception about justice?
I suspect that you simply arrived at your answers without the need to iden-
tify a theory and then apply it. Of course, you may have had a general
theory-that the two children ought to be treated equally. But this theory
is too abstract to account for the different answers to the mother's various
explanations.93
I suggest that we answer these questions-as we answer all justice ques-
tions-by mentally comparing the picture suggested by the situation under
93. In saying this, I do not subscribe wholly to Professor Peter Westen's theory that equality




discussion with thousands of pictures in our brains.94 We process these
thousands of pictures extremely rapidly; indeed, our mental processes them-
selves already reflect our amalgamation of these pictures, as well as what we
have learned from them.9" As a result, we recognizefairness and unfairness
quite rapidly. When fairness or unfairness is not immediately apparent
from the picture-data we are given, we quickly know what additional ques-
tions to ask. Our ability to formulate these "justice-questions" is neither a
matter of instinct nor a matter of having learned the theory of justice.96
Rather, it stems from our rich experience in listening to justice stories and
learning how to arrive at conclusions about whether such stories end in a
decision that is just or unjust. 97
By the time students enter law school, they already have a finely tuned
sense of justice. There is very little need to further develop their sense of
justice, even though the range of application of their "justice-thoughts" to
new situations is extended by the law school experience of reading hundreds
of cases and pondering whether the decisions in those cases were just or
unjust. I believe that the three year law school as presently constituted
diminishes the students' sense of justice. At present we are unteaching jus-
tice. We are presenting to the students truncated fact situations and slabs of
rhetorical justification. We do not inquire whether there were other facts
that those stated by the court, nor do we ask what the parties actually did to
solve their problem before, during, and after litigation.
Although there is no need to teach students a sense of justice-they
already come to law schools with it-we must at least stop imparting the
incessant message in our courses that justice is not relevant to the law. I do
not claim that we impart this message explicitly. Indeed, most professors I
94. The "pictures" in our brains are not necessarily images we have stored in our memory
banks. Rather, they may also consist of processes of analysis---what Minsky has called K-lines.
See M. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 82 (1986).
95. Id. at 81-92.
96. The picture of a justice situation I have described in the cake-slicing example is specific
and extendable. In contrast, theories about justice tend to be amorphous and vague. In PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC, Plato engages in extensive dialogues addressing whether justice means "the inter-
est of the stronger" (Thrasymachus) or whether it means "happiness," or "truth." The net result,
I submit, tells us nothing useful about justice.
97. Indeed, the way we "solve" justice problems is the same as the way we engage in prob-
lem-solving behavior generally. We learn to solve problems by dealing with problems (at a very
early age) and solving them by trial and error. We learn to solve problems rapidly because the
correct answer is usually quite apparent (e.g., if the baby pushes the food away, the baby will not
be able to eat the food; so the baby quickly learns to bring the food toward its mouth). Similarly,
we learn to solve justice problems by listening to the thousands of stories we hear as a child,
formulating our own answer, and comparing it with the answer of people we trust (our parents,
the clergy, authors of books we read, and so on).
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know will occasionally or even usually ask whether the result reached by
the court was fair. Rather, we convey the message that justice is irrelevant
in a far more profound and subtle fashion: by insisting that the court's
decision is "right" or "wrong" on the basis of purely legal analysis (i.e., on
the basis of stitching together the appropriate pattern of law-words).98
Some of our leading theorists have, in effect, argued for the irrelevance
of justice by concentrating on other allegedly normative decisional criteria.
In so doing, these theorists deflect our concern away from justice considera-
tions. For example, although Judge Richard Posner has shown that resort
to economic criteria in deciding cases may promote market efficiency, he
has not been able to go the next step and convince his readers that market
efficiency (and/or wealth maximization)99 is justice driven. Indeed, he
seems to suggest that justice itself reduces to a market function of getting
the economic analysis right.l"o A more subtly insidious message is con-
tained in Ronald Dworkin's "law as integrity" thesis.101 By insisting that
"the law" should be followed because it has integrity, his entire construct
boils down to a claim that in a case where law-as-integrity is on one side
and justice on the other, law-as-integrity trumps justice. The Nazi case of
judges zealously applying Aryan principles to thwart the justice claims of
minority groups is just as much an exemplification of the law-as-integrity
thesis as it was of Dworkin's prior "right answer" thesis (where the right
answer was discoverable from the existing legal materials).1 2 From the
point of view of the Nazi judge, both law-as-integrity and right-answer help
to reinforce the judge's decision to interpret Nazi law as embodying and
reflecting the Aryan "philosophy."10 3
98. As previously discussed, I regard the use of the words "right" and "wrong" in the context
of legal analysis as impermissibly parasitic upon the moral content that we invest in those words.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
99. For an example of how wealth maximization can be deconstructed, see D'Amato, Can
Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 513 (1989).
100. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
101. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
102. See, R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). It is high time that defenders of
Dworkinism stop objecting to the "Nazi" example as pathological. The fact is that it persists as a
vivid exemplar of the consequences of Dworkin's theories as defeating justice claims. If the
"Nazi" example is a real consequence of the application of Dworkin's theories, then there are
millions of less noticeable examples where justice is also trumped as a consequence of those
theories.
103. There are times when Dworkin seems to hover ambiguously between a positivist and a
naturalist position, such as in his early "Model of Rules" essay. See Id.; cf D'Amato, Lon Fuller
and Substantive NaturalLaw, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 202 (1981). But I believe a very careful reading of
Dworkin's works would result in finding that he has consistently found the ultimate source of all
legal decision-making in written texts (in short, in law-words), whether those texts are statutes,
cases, political philosophies about law, or theories about everything that can be found in a law
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Current theoretical approaches to law may thus contribute to the prob-
lem of deflecting justice concerns in favor of the pet illusory theoretical
constructs of a given author. Classroom teaching surely will reflect some of
the academy's leading theoretical positions, and therefore a wholesale re-
evaluation of these theories may be necessary before the clouds of theory
that overhang our classrooms can be dissipated.
In the classroom, there is, in my view, only one initial question to be
asked of any case: "Was the result fair (or just)?" If the professor's view of
the result reflects a certain policy or theory, then that professor ought to ask
the further question: "Does the policy (or theory) comport with justice?"
Constant classroom attention to the normative dimension of justice will
help our students become better lawyers because, as lawyers, they will only
succeed in persuading judges to the extent that they can convince the judge
or decision-maker (or the other side in a negotiating session) that their cli-
ent's position is fair and just.
There is no textual answer to the question whether a given judicial deci-
sion is fair. The question should be posed to law students to elicit their
sense of justice. Often I suspect that the best answers will be: "We need to
know more facts-specifically, we need to know whether .... " And if this
is the answer, then the next line of inquiry should be: "What did the law-
yers do to elicit (or suppress) those particular facts? Why weren't those
facts part of the plaintiff's or defendant's case? Why weren't those facts
brought out at trial? Did rules of evidence unfairly suppress them? If the
facts were elicited at trial, why didn't the judge mention them when he
summarized the facts of the case?" These, in my view, should be the sorts
of questions that go back and forth between professor and student in any
course. The legal subject matter of a given course (say, tax, or antitrust, or
white-collar crime) will put a spin on the questions asked. What seems to
be relevant missing factual information in a tax course might be different
from, or only overlap partially with, relevant missing factual information in
white collar crime that considers a case of a tax evader. (Course-specific
relevance here is part of the heuristic function of legal rules that I men-
tioned earlier.)"°4 As students get more proficient in asking these kinds of
library or on a LEXIS ® or WESTLAW ® computer. In brief, I believe the Dworkin is, aufond, a
positivist. If so, he is vulnerable to the "Nazi" argument (and to the South Africa argument and
indeed to any legal pathology); he cannot escape (although he and others often try) by saying that
the Nazi example is weird or pathological. For many German citizens during the Third Reich,
the Nazi laws seemed somewhat excessive but not at all weird. I am sure that many Americans
have similarly viewed many American laws (consider the views American women must have had
about nineteenth-century laws in the United States).
104. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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questions and pursuing them down whatever avenues they open up, stu-
dents will be getting training in effective lawyering.
I have so far argued for two broad propositions: First, that justice and
law are separate; in precisely the same way that a normative statement and
an empirical statement are separate; and second, that justice cannot be re-
duced to words. To complete the picture, I would like to add a third propo-
sition: that justice is in fact pre-verbal. I have spelled out this argument in
some detail elsewhere.I"5 Here I want to stress only that our sense of justice
depends fundamentally on our sense of similarity. The sense of similarity,
as Rudolf Carnap demonstrated in his masterwork, The Logical Structure
of the World,"' is a more primitive notion than language. Indeed, language
ability would be impossible without it.
When one stops to think how dependent law is on similarity, one finds
that similarity is no less than the engine that makes law work. For exam-
ple, how do we determine what cases constitute precedents for the case at
hand? We look to see whether their facts are similar or analogous to the
facts of the present case. We expect the judge to decide our case in con-
formity with the decisions of the closest similar precedents. Or consider
how we determine that a statute applies to a given case. We form a mutual
picture of the kind of situation that the statute is generally considered to
apply to, and see if the present case is similar to that general picture. For
instance, consider the simplest of all possible pieces of legislation: a stop
sign at an intersection. We cannot tell just from the word "stop" what we
are supposed to do (Should we stop talking when we see the sign? Stop walk-
ing? Stop breathing?). Rather, we form a picture of what the sign signifies.
Our mental image is that of an automobile coming to a stop at the intersec-
tion. Then if we see a real automobile coming down the street-or a truck
or a bus-we compare the scene to our mental image and expect the real
car, truck, or bus to come to a stop just as our minds play for us an internal
motion picture consisting of a vehicle coming to a stop at the stop sign. But
even that is not the end of the movie. If it were, we would end with a
stopped vehicle. Should it remain stopped forever? Again, we consult our
mental image and view on the movie screen of our minds an automobile
coming to a stop at the intersection, then starting and moving on. It is this
full motion picture that we utilize when we interpret the stop sign. It will
coincide with many real world scenes, but of course it will not solve all
105. See, D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 148 (1990).
106. R. CARNAP, THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AND PSEUDOPROBLEMS IN
PHILOSOPHY (R.A. George trans. 1967). For an extended commentary on Carnap's work, see N.
GOODMAN, THE STRUCTURE OF APPEARANCE (1977).
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problems. 107 For example, does a bicycle rider have to stop at the stop
sign? How close is a bicycle to our mental image of the automobile? Why
was the sign put there in the first place? We start to fill in our mental image
with justice considerations. The stop sign was placed there to avoid acci-
dents between vehicles coming into the intersection simultaneously at right
angles to each other and to avoid pedestrian accidents at the crossing.
These considerations of justice might help us take a reasonable position
whether the stop sign ought to apply to bicycles.
By calling justice "pre-verbal," I open myself to the objection that one
person's pre-verbal conception of justice may differ from another person's,
and because both conceptions are pre-verbal, it is impossible to find rational
grounds for settling their differences. If rationality is out the window, what
point is there in teaching justice? This objection proves too much because it
applies not only to justice but to all the values that we have. All our values
are "pre-verbal." But our values can be shaped as we learn more about the
world. Our "justice" value is shaped by the stories we hear about human
situations and how those situations were resolved. Indeed, law school can
be a very efficient place to refine and develop our innate conception of jus-
tice. In arguing before a court, we can only hope that the main value the
judge has is justice. (If the judge instead values more than anything else his
friendship with the attorney opposing us, we are probably going to lose the
case.) 108 We can only hope that the judge has also developed a refined sense
of justice by virtue of a good law school education, so that the facts we raise
on behalf of our client may resonate with the judge's conception of relevant
justice-facts.
My adjuration that law schools should teach justice and not "law" may
seem to reduce to a verbal question that might be asked as follows: What
do we mean when we say we teach "law?" If this reduction seems correct
to you, then my answer would be: teaching justice is a way to teach law.
Since law is taught by the mental operation of similarity and analogy and
since common law depends on precedents, the law depends on precedents
and the legal process works when we compare past decisions to present
ones. All we have to add is the normative component: that we ought to
107. I was once ticketed for going through a stop sign. In traffic court, I admitted that I did
not stop, but argued that the sign itself was misplaced. It was in the middle of a street, not at the
end, and I did not see it because it was raining and I was looking out for pedestrians and other
traffic. To the great surprise of the state's attorney, the judge ruled in my favor. However, the
judge could easily have held against me on the same facts and on the same "law."
108. Cf United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1515, 1538 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A judge could be
concerned about handing his friend [the prosecutor in the Murphy case] a galling defeat on the eve
of a joint vacation").
[Vol. 74:1
RETHINKING LEGAL EDUCATION
decide present cases similarly to the way past cases were decided. And this
"ought" is provided by the consideration of justice. Justice requires the
perpetuation of precedents because that is the only way to treat present
litigants fairly. As the old lich puts it, justice means treating like cases
alike. This is not a tautology; it is a profound truth. It is a tautology only
at the verbal level, but since (I claim that) justice notions are pre-verbal,
what case is "like" another is a primitive pre-verbal notion that cannot be
defeated by verbal logic constructs.
In order to study whether a past decision is similar to a present case, we
need to know the facts of the past decision, and compare them to the pres-
ent facts. Legal training thus consists of reading hundreds of cases and
comparing them with each other and with present fact situations. In doing
this work, we will sharpen our sense of justice by honing our ability to
recognize patterns of factual similarity and analogy.109
But one might object that factual patterns are always both similar and
dissimilar to other factual patterns. Which dissimilarities should we ig-
nore? If the previous automobile accident case involved a collision between
a Toyota and a Honda, is it similar to the present case involving a collision
between a Volkswagen and a Chevrolet? Such questions cannot be decided
on either a verbal level or on the level of physical reality. Instead, we must
resort to our mental pictures about "justice" stories. Would it be unfair to
treat the latter collision differently from the former one if the only difference
is in the makes of the automobiles? Our answer, as usual, is "Yes, unless.
.. " The "unless" part of the answer suggests the subsidiary question: Did
the makes of the automobiles have anything to do with any of the factors
that were involved in the accident (i.e., visibility, braking power, cornering
power, etc., and whether drivers knew about these factors and could have
taken reasonable precautions)? If we cannot find any further facts along
these lines, then I suggest we would all agree that the makes of the
automobiles should not result in dissimilar judgments between the two
cases.
It is clear from these examples that teaching justice instead of "law"'
does not entail wholesale jettisoning of existing courses or casebooks. I am
109. A lazy move in precisely the wrong direction is to say that the case at hand is like the
precedential case if the rule of decision is similar. After Wittgenstein, we can no longer character-
ize a previous case by its "rule of decision" because there are an infinite number of "rules of
decision" that equally fit its facts. Additionally, there are an infinite number of "rules" that char-
acterize the facts of the case at hand. To compare one infinite collection of rules to another is to
waste one's time. If we are to understand law as it really is, we must abandon the notion that a
case is an illustrated rule. One case is "like" another in the only sense that we care about whether
the facts of the two cases are similar.
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talking about a change of focus, of emphasis-but it is a change that would
reverberate in every course and in every class session. The question we
should ask of every case is not, "What is the rule of law that this case lays
down?" but rather, "Was justice done to the parties?" ' If we find that
justice was not done, we should examine how the legal system went wrong.
Perhaps it went wrong because of bad lawyering. Perhaps the "rule" that
the case could be said to exemplify should have been interpreted differently
by the court. Perhaps certain facts were not adduced in court because a
lawyer thought that those facts were not legally relevant. Indeed, bad lawy-
ering-a product of the way law schools train future lawyers-is often asso-
ciated with blunders at the trial level concerning the introduction of
evidence; the incompetent attorney is too readily convinced of the legal ir-
relevancy of potent evidence. Yet, if we are trying to achieve justice, we
may find that facts that appeared to be legally irrelevant are significant from
a justice standpoint. Since the rules of evidence are intended in the aggre-
gate to promote justice, any one of them is open to challenge or
reinterpretation.
More particularly, rules of evidence are the legal system's way of fram-
ing the issues at trial in a manner that makes those issues manageable to a
judge and jury. Yet, the very framework can keep out facts that are highly
relevant to a fair resolution of the issues. We are always putting legal
frames around factual situations-temporal frames and spacial frames. An
important article by Mark Kelman discusses the tensions that operate on
these frames in the field of criminal law.111 Although Professor Kelman's
self-selected perspective is that of legal neutrality, in fact each of the issues
he discusses can be reinterpreted as a dispute over justice-whether crimi-
nal law should come down on the side of justice to the individual defendant
or justice to society." 2 Of course, these are broad antithetical positions;
110. The very question, "What rule of law does this case stand for?" is metaphysically ab-
surd. There is no ontology about the matter. All cases have to be interpreted, all rules purporting
to stem from cases have to be interpreted, and the indeterminacy of a case is such that any number
of conflicting rules may explain the case equally well.
I 11. See, Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981). For an important expansion of Kelman's approach, see Balkin, The Rhetoric of
Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197 (1990).
112. Take the notion of deterrence. Deterrence has nothing to do with the individual defend-
ant. He is punished only because of the exemplary value of his punishment on future would-be
criminals. Punishing him raises the cost-effectiveness of crime to others. It follows from a pure
deterrence theory that a defendant who is perceived by the public to be guilty yet who is in fact
innocent should be punished. The deterrence theory thus encourages prosecutors to suppress
exonerating evidence, to argue that certain proffered evidence is "irrelevant," and to resort to
"dirty tricks" to get the jury to return a verdict of guilty. Writers who champion an "economic"
approach to law are apt to favor the theory of deterrence over all competing theories of criminal-
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truth in any individual case requires delicate shading of the various justice
claims.
When we ask the justice question of legal materials, we find that the
things edited from contemporary casebooks are the most perspicuous. The
casebook is likely to give a condensed summary of the facts-condensed by
the editors from the court's own opinion, which itself was already a highly
selective and summarized account of the facts. The casebook then goes on
to present portions of the court's reasoning.113 What we need to know most
of all are the facts that are missing. What were the real facts of the case?
What stories did the parties tell their attorneys? What did the attorneys do
with those stories? Did the attorneys advise the parties to take further steps
either to improve their eventual litigating position or to avoid litigation en-
tirely? What was that advice? Did the clients take it? Was it good advice?
When the case got to trial, what did the jury hear? What can we find in the
transcript of the trial? What about evidence that the jury did not hear be-
cause the judge ruled that it was inadmissible? How did the attorneys argue
the inadmissibility questions? What were the attorneys' final statements to
the jury? All of these questions arise before the appellate court ever gets the
case and before the appellate court summarizes the facts. We need to know
the answers to some of these questions before we can determine whether the
appellate court's summary of the facts is fair and accurate. Furthermore,
there are factual questions that arise after the appellate court has ruled.
Was the judgment ever collected? Was the case settled after the court's
ruling came in? If it was a criminal case, what happened to the defendant?
If the defendant was later pardoned by the governor on the ground of inno-
cence, should not that fact alone cast doubt on the fairness of the court's
proceedings? Finally, what role did the judgment play in the lives of the
parties? Did both sides accept the judgment and move on with their lives,
or was one side permanently embittered by the judgment? In commercial
cases, what steps were taken by the losing party to change its ways of doing
business? If the losing party regarded the judicial decision as unjust, what
steps if any did it take to retaliate against the winner?
Many of my colleagues will immediately cry to such questions: "Irrele-
vant! What happened to the parties before or after the case-that the court
ity. I suggest that all their theories, as well as the theory of deterrence itself, be reexamined in law
school classes in criminal law in the context of specific cases to see if the rhetoric of deterrence
operates to exclude justice-relevant categories of evidence from the trier of fact.
113. The worst examples in this regard are the "illustrations" given in the various Restate-
ments of law. These are nothing other than tautological repetitions of the black-letter "rules."
For some additional invective against restatements, see D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 54 (1983).
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did not know about or mention-can have absolutely nothing to do with
the law."
But it is precisely this notion of irrelevance that I am attacking. Why
are the questions of what really happened to the parties irrelevant?
Whether or not they may appear to be legally irrelevant under the law as we
presently conceive it says nothing about what the law ought to be; it only
betokens our presently myopic view of "law." Law, as it is presently con-
ceived, wears blinders that block out observation of what happened to real
people in real situations. 114 Yet, what happens to real people in real situa-
tions is what justice is all about. Thus it is our present notion of "law" that
needs rethinking. For "law" is and can be only the existential appearance
of words printed on paper. Changes in those texts are perhaps curious phe-
nomena, worthy of an arcane scholar's inquiry (although our law reviews
are full of such endeavors). But in every case that our students will ever be
called upon to handle in real life, the words on the law book pages have no
intrinsic interest-they are simply the "given." The attorney is called upon
to take what is "given" and show the court that a proper, fair, reasonable,
and just interpretation of the "given" is necessary in order to do justice to
the parties. The opposing attorneys will disagree as to what interpretation
is proper, fair, reasonable, and just. And the question will be settled-as-
suming there is a fair-minded judge interested in doing justice-according
to a comparative evaluation of the facts as presented by both sides against
the judge's sense of justice. The "facts" cannot be legally circumscribed
without falling back into the regressive view of "law" that I am attacking.
Rather, it is the inherent sympathetic1 5 appreciation of the facts that
should drive our interpretation of the "relevant" legal rules. To do it the
other way around-to say that the legal rules tell us what facts are rele-
vant-is to put on legal blinders (blinders of our own making) and thus to
perpetuate injustice and bad lawyering.
Perhaps the claim with the most practical pay-off that I am making in
this essay is my argument that if we teach justice, and not law, our students
will receive better legal training than they now get. This practical argument
is one not normally associated with discussions about "justice." Indeed, if a
law school were to suddenly announce that it will henceforth teach justice,
and not law, the outside community reaction might well be negative: Law
schools should develop the groundwork for professional competency, and
not pursue justice or truth. Thus, the change that I am advocating would
require a re-education of the public as to what good law schools are all
114. As a result, law, on the whole, ill-fits the real interests of real people in real situations.
115. In Hume's sense of "sympathy."
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about. But re-education, even of adults, is possible if it is grounded in a
firm conviction that the shift to justice will result in doing the professional
competency job better.
To indicate how "justice-teaching" could work, let us first consider the
basic structure of law the way it is presently taught. Consider the basic
case, Plaintiff v. Defendant. Law schools today teach students the best legal
arguments for both P and D. This is what the subject matter of courses on
Contracts, Torts, Criminal Law, Antitrust, and Tax have in common. We
look at a reported case, we analyze why one side won, we consider the
arguments for the other side, and we pit the arguments against each other.
We might say that P seems to win under the relevant statutes, but D has a
good case under the relevant precedents whereas P can come back with a
policy argument, and D can rejoin with an economic theory; but P can
rebut with an exception to the economic theory, and so forth.
But much more is needed. The ideal classroom exercise would go on to
question whether there might have been other facts that the attorneys could
have adduced that would have shifted the justice considerations to the other
side. What kinds of facts might they have been? Do we have any evidence
that these facts were in fact available to the attorneys? Were important
"justice-facts" excluded at trial for evidentiary or strategic reasons? And
are we unintentionally excluding a set of relevant facts because they seem to
come under the aegis of some law school course other than the present
course? 11
6
Indeed, the "justice dialogue"-whether in the classroom or among a
group of friends conversing socially-invariably consists of adducing more
facts and arguing for their analogical relevance. To revert to the cake divid-
ing example, some of the mother's explanations for giving the larger slice to
Jane seem to call out for additional elucidation. When she answers, "Be-
cause it's Tuesday," we want to know more facts. Is she alternating be-
tween her two children depending on the day of the week? Is there some
116. For example, the "duty to warn" and the "duty to rescue" are topics of perennial inter-
est to first year-law students. They learn that in Anglo-American law, a person has absolutely no
duty to warn a perfect stranger of impending disaster or to rescue an imperiled stranger even if the
cost of rescue is trivial. See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898); Osterlind v.
Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). But the students learn this "lesson" in the confines of the
Torts course. Their conclusion may be nothing more than an artificial consequence of the curricu-
lar decision to have separate courses in Torts and Criminal Law. A solution to the moral dilemma
posited by the cases can be found, I believe, if we look at Criminal Law. The justice considera-
tions do not play out when confined to Torts but require going to a different set of concepts taught
in a different course (Criminal Law). For the full argument, see D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan"
Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 798 (1976), reprinted with minor additions in A. D'AMATO, JURIS-
PRUCENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 287 (1984).
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other form of compensation for Tom (who on Tuesday is getting the smaller
slice)? A classroom discussion of a case can elicit questions as to the sort of
facts that might make a justice-difference to the decision-maker. Some of
these facts might be available in the court's own summary of the facts;
others might be provided by the casebook editor; and still others would be
speculative. Consider the typical first interview between an attorney and a
prospective client. The attorney is not content just to listen to the client's
story; rather, she asks questions and follow-up questions in order to get the
kind of factual picture that she can then examine to see whether there is any
cost-effective recourse for the client that the lawyer can provide.
The justice-dialogue in the classroom may or may not lead to a conclu-
sion that one side is "right" and the other "wrong." But this conclusion
will be debated, and the debate will focus primarily on the competing sto-
ries of the clients, fleshed out by the further elucidation of facts (or hypo-
thetical facts) resulting from the classroom discussion. Legal theories serve
as heuristics in the minds of students who are elucidating these further
facts. But the theories are not themselves the end of the story-any theory
over-determines the facts and any set of facts under-determines the theory.
What finally counts, when heuristics are exhausted, is the sense of justice
that one party's story is more morally compelling than the other's story.
Can such "justice-dialogues" be taught? Obviously yes, but classroom
dialogue is required. Lecturing does not work here.1 17
The classroom dialogue is enhanced because students know the actual
result that was reached by the court. They can then ask whether the court
reached a just result. If unjust, what did the parties do (or what could they
have done) after the judgment was rendered in order to ameliorate the in-
justice? What steps could either party take in the future to change its be-
havior in order to live with the result reached by the court?
The "analytical skills" we teach might not be noticeably different if our
focus is on justice instead of law. Students will still receive the same basic
and, I think, excellent law school training in analysis, organization, and
persuasion. But I think the students' level of interest will be much higher
117. I have argued that lecturing does not even work for traditional law instruction. See
D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 461 (1987). It certainly cannot work for discussions of justice. Nor can any textbook do
the justice job. There is no lecture or textual substitute for teaching justice in the classroom. In
one sense, my argument for teaching justice in law schools and not "law" is a return to the value
of civilized dialogue. This value is largely being lost in a media-hyped age. When we actually
have the luxury of a classroom dialogue, it is a sheer waste for the professor to deliver a lecture.
For a lecture can be written and distributed to the students to read at their own leisure (i.e., when
they are watching television). It cannot do the justice job, which is a conversation job.
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because the exercises are conducted with a purpose-a human purpose, the
purpose of discovering more about justice and how fair solutions to
problems can help people live better and more satisfying lives (which in-
cludes lives that are not wrenched and distorted by the intrusion of law and
litigation).
But it is quite clear that the analytical questions professors would ask,
when justice is the focus of the classroom exercise, will be more factual.
Law-questions tend to pile theory upon theory, rationalization upon ration-
alization, invented category upon invented category. These may be intellec-
tually stimulating exercises, but they have nothing to do with influencing
the decisions that judges make. In contrast, justice-questions will be more
factual-we need more and more evidence of what people did, what they
did not do (perhaps on advice of counsel), and what happened to them
when they acted or avoided acting. It should be the facts that drive the
theory (including the theory that is the course on Contracts, Torts, Prop-
erty, or whatever) and not the other way around.
The fact intensiveness of many justice-questions means that current
casebooks will need revision and expansion in order to accommodate the
new curriculum that I am proposing. It will no longer be sufficient for a
casebook compiler merely to present snippets of appellate court opinions.
Instead, a "case" should be presented in a much fuller version than is avail-
able in the court reporters. With very old cases, the research may be diffi-
cult, but fortunately the vast majority of cases studied in law schools are
recent decisions. The casebook editor should read the transcripts of the
trials of the cases and present excerpts of the evidence presented to the trial
court. In addition, the editor should look at the briefs of the contending
parties and compare their statements of facts. When there are facts in the
briefs that have been ignored by the court in its own summary of the facts,
the casebook should present those ignored facts. Facts and issues should
not be excised simply because they would come under the rubric of some
other law school course."' It would be additionally helpful if the casebook
editor contacts the lawyers in any given case and interviews them as to
118. This is perhaps the hardest task to assign to a compiler of a coursebook on Contracts,
Torts, Property, or whatever. Editors believe that it is only the "contracts issue" in a particular
case that is relevant to the course on Contracts. But the real world is not like that. In the real
world, cases contain interconnected issues. It is the case that should drive law school study, not
just the aspect of the case that "fits" an artificial legal distinction (i.e., the "distinction" between
Torts and Contracts). This is not to say that every aspect of every case needs to be included in
every coursebook. Editorial judgment is still needed as to the issues that are factually intercon-
nected (these should be included whether they come under the rubric of Torts or Contracts, for
example) and issues that are factually separable (these may, with caution, be selected according to
the pedagogical needs of the moment).
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other facts that seem missing from the court's account of the facts. The
lawyers will also be a source of litigating strategies that can usefully be
added to the account of the case.119 Finally, the editor should discover, if
possible, what happened to the parties after the decision was rendered. Was
the judgment collected? Were there other lawsuits? Did the parties enter
into a new contract? Did they modify their subsequent behavior in order to
avoid--or take advantage of-the ruling in the case? Did the law firms
themselves revise their "boilerplate" and legal fie-library in order to ac-
commodate the decision?120
Teaching from a justice perspective does not mean that a case will be
analyzed from only one side. Law schools should teach both sides of the
case, not only because practicing attorneys must be prepared to argue for
their clients regardless of what side of a case their clients are on but also
because it is necessary in preparing one side of a case to imagine what the
best arguments are on the other side of the case. Teaching from a justice
119. Obviously the approach I am suggesting will mean that the number of cases in casebooks
will have to be drastically reduced in order to accommodate fuller account of the cases that the
editor decides to include. But that is no real loss if we take seriously the idea that law schools
should not be in the business of imparting the detailed content of existing rules of law. Rather
they should be in the business of training students to be good attorneys. This training requires
study of cases in their full dimensionality and not merely in the time-slice of the appellate court's
decision. In this connection, it has never ceased to amaze me how many professors seem to feel
the need to "cover the field" in their approach to any course they teach. They will cover the field
rapidly like a jet plane zooming over a landscape. All the rich details of the landscape will be lost
in the effort to impart an overview of their subject. They feel that every aspect of their course is of
vital importance. What is amazing is that these same professors champion the idea of student
choice in course selection. In other words, it may be absolutely vital that a student cover every
aspect of corporate law in a course on Corporations, but at the same time a student may choose to
go through law school without taking the Corporations course at all. From an overall educational
perspective, I find the juxtaposition of these two principles to be ironic. If it is vital for a student
to learn every aspect of corporate law, then how can we justify giving a law school degree to
students who do not take Corporations at all? My guess is that there is no educational principle at
work here. Instead, law school curricula are the product of political accommodations among
existing faculty members and a perceived need to hire new professors according to available
"slots."
An intense, dimensional experience with a few cases is, in my view, better for the students'
education than a repetitive, shallow overview of a great many cases.
120. I have written these sentences in the text in light of my previously expressed position-
one that may not be familiar to the reader and hence should be noted here because it links what I
say to a larger picture of law-that has been summarized by Arthur Jacobson:
Law in D'Amato's jurisprudence constitutes a conspiracy between citizens and authorita-
tive legal institutions---each acting within their sphere to maximize their power. The bro-
ker of the conspiracy at the center of the legal system is the lawyer. American
jurisprudence-from Madison to Llewellyn-has traditionally regarded power as the de-
stroyer of law. D'Amato has found a way to turn power into law's chief creative element.
A. D'AMATO, supra note 116, at vii (Foreword by Jacobson).
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perspective means looking at both sides of the case critically and coming to
a conclusion that, on the facts as given, one side had the better claim in
justice than the other side. Moreover, one of the most important "justice"
lessons that can be learned is the ability to put oneself in the other person's
shoes or what Hume called "sympathy" and what we now call "empa-
thy."1 21 Putting oneself in another person's shoes requires knowing a lot
more about that person and the facts of that person's situation than simply
knowing the content of law-words. Thus, teaching from a justice perspec-
tive can significantly improve empathic argumentative ability-something
that law schools are already doing fairly well.
VI. CONCLUSION
We should phase out the teaching of law because it amounts to navel-
contemplation. Excessive preoccupation with the tools (the law-words) of
the legal system distorts, in some students perhaps irrevocably, what law is
all about and what it is for. It elevates tools over goals, form over sub-
stance, manipulations over justice.
If we begin to teach our students that what matters is justice, sooner or
later society will learn the same thing. For some of our students will some-
day fill the benches of the courts throughout the country. What they think
the law is will be what the law will become. If we should succeed in broad-
ening their conceptions of "law" while they are in law school, even though
that broader conception right now appears to be radical, sooner or later that
same conception will define what law is and then be accepted as conserva-
tive and traditional. Just as medicine is all about health and architecture is
all about aesthectically acceptable buildings that do not fall down, ulti-
mately everyone should perceive that law is all about justice.
121. See Jaffe, Empathic Adjustment-An Alternative to Rules, Policies, and Politics, 58 U.
CINN. L. REV. 1161 (1990).
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